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[This article provides a review of the history, structure and form of the law of sedition, focusing on 
the new provisions inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) in 2005 as part of a wider 
counter-terrorism package. A short historical review of sedition in Australia is followed by a critical 
analysis of the new offences, which explores the constitutional and human rights implications of 
these new offences. Critical attention is given to the process of law reform that seeks to ‘balance’ 
security and human rights, focusing on the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission which emerged from the retrospective review of the 2005 reforms. Our conclusion is that 
the ‘balanced’ model endorsed by the Australian Law Reform Commission produces incoherence in 
relation to the definition of offences and ‘good faith’ defences. In particular, incoherence is produced 
by definitions of offences that are over-inclusive or under-inclusive depending on the rationale 
(security or human rights) which is accorded priority.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
Law reform has become a vexed task in this ‘age of terror’. In the ‘first wave’ 
of post-September 11, 2001 law reform, attention focused on the core offences 
dealing with ‘terrorist acts’ and provisions proscribing terrorist organisations.1 In 
the wake of the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 and the London bombings 
in July 2005, the focus has shifted to monitoring and disrupting the activities of 
local ‘suspect’ communities.2 The legislative reforms enacted in late 2005 
reflected these trends. Aimed at the perceived root causes of terrorism, the 
reforms created new powers to impose control orders and authorise preventative 
detention.3 Most significantly, for the purpose of this article, the package of 
counter-terrorism measures also contained provisions dealing with those 
organisations and individuals who advocate terrorist acts. The definition of a 
proscribed terrorist organisation was broadened to include an organisation which 
‘advocates’ the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred 
or will occur).4 At the same time, the offence of sedition was modernised. The 
sedition provisions attracted considerable public attention and disquiet in the 
media,5 leading the Australian Government to take the unusual step of requesting 
the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) to undertake a retrospective 
review of the new sedition laws.6 
Australia is not the only jurisdiction to criminalise the advocacy of terrorism. 
For example, art 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism requires state parties to establish an offence of ‘public provocation to 
commit a terrorist offence’.7 The United Kingdom Parliament has recently 
enacted the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK) c 11, which provides that the ‘encourage-
ment’ or ‘glorification’ of terrorism is an offence. Doubts have been expressed as 
 
 1 For a review of these counter-terrorism offences, see Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, 
Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) ch 15. See also Criminal Code divs 101 (‘Terrorism’), 
102 (‘Terrorist Organisations’). The Criminal Code is contained in the Schedule to the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
 2 For an earlier study of the impact of counter-terrorism laws on these communities, see Paddy 
Hillyard, Suspect Community: People’s Experiences of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Brit-
ain (1993) ch 2. 
 3 The Anti-Terrorism Bill [No 2] 2005 (Cth) containing these provisions was introduced into the 
House of Representatives on 3 November 2005. 
 4 Criminal Code s 102.1(2). Under Criminal Code s 102.1(1A), an organisation ‘advocates’ the 
doing of a terrorist act if:  
(a) the organisation directly or indirectly counsels or urges the doing of a terrorist act; or 
(b) the organisation directly or indirectly provides instruction on the doing of a terrorist 
act; or 
(c) the organisation directly praises the doing of a terrorist act … 
 5 See, eg, ABC Television, ‘Govt Introduces Anti-Terrorism Legislation’, The 7.30 Report, 3 
November 2005 <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2005/s1497388.htm>; Bruce Wolpe, 
‘Democracy Endangered if War on Terrorism Gags the Press’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 24 November 2005, 15. 
 6 The ALRC followed, in a constrained time frame, the normal process of consultation. It 
produced an issues paper and discussion paper: ALRC, Review of Sedition Laws, Issues Paper 
No 30 (2006); ALRC, Review of Sedition Laws, Discussion Paper No 71 (2006). The ALRC’s 
final report was tabled in Parliament on 13 September 2006: ALRC, Fighting Words: A Review 
of Sedition Laws in Australia, Report No 104 (2006). 
 7 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, opened for signature 16 May 
2005, CETS 196, art 5 (not yet in force). 
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to whether the offences created by the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK) c 11 are com-
patible with the freedom of expression, which is protected by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,8 
and no doubt its compatibility will be the subject of challenge under the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42. Expressing concerns that such an offence would 
constitute an unwarranted interference with the constitutionally protected 
freedom of political communication, the ALRC has not proposed the adoption of 
a glorification offence in Australia.9 The ALRC has also recommended the 
removal of the term ‘sedition’ from the federal criminal statute book, while 
retaining a range of modernised ‘offences against political liberty and public 
order’ that cover similar ground.10 
The purpose of this article is twofold — it gives a review of the history, struc-
ture and form of the new sedition offences in the Criminal Code, as well as a 
critique of the model of law reform that seeks to ‘balance’ security and human 
rights. 
A short historical review of sedition will be followed by an analysis of the new 
substantive offences, which will outline the constitutional and human rights 
implications of these offences. In our assessment, pursuing a ‘balanced’ model 
has produced incoherence in relation to both the definitions of the offence and 
‘good faith’ defences. The resulting provisions are over-inclusive or un-
der-inclusive depending on the rationale (security or human rights) which is 
accorded priority. Notwithstanding the appeal of these models to politicians, 
policymakers and law reformers, we believe that maintaining legitimacy in the 
prosecution of serious crimes of terrorism requires the highest levels of compli-
ance with human rights. For this reason, we believe that because the protection 
of human rights should lie at the heart of terrorism law reform and 
counter-terrorism strategies, law reformers and law-makers must resist an 
approach which ‘balances’ civil rights out of the equation. Finally, we offer some 
reflections on the uncivil processes of terrorism law reform and law-making, 
which have been ‘unbalanced’ by the prevailing climate of urgency and political 
expediency.11 
I I   A SHORT HISTORY OF SEDITION:  SYMBOLIC PROSECUTION OR 
POLITICAL PERSECUTION? 
The origins of sedition can be traced to the common law offence of seditious 
libel. Its history, from the colonial period to the mid-20th century, was a shameful 
story of political persecution of those who criticised government policy, and 
 
 8 Opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222, art 10 (entered into force 3 September 
1953). 
 9 See further ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 125. 
 10 See Recommendation 2–1: ibid 67. 
 11 See, eg, Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General, ‘A Safe and Secure Australia: An Update on 
Counter-Terrorism’ (Speech delivered at the Manly Pacific Hotel, Sydney, 21 January 2006) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/ministerruddockhome.nsf/Page/RWPE242AA0BB975E18E
CA2570FE00787070>. 
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unpopular minorities.12 Following a brief revival in the post-World War II period 
in response to the perceived communist threat, sedition was consigned by many 
commentators to the ‘dustbin of legal history’.13 That assessment stood firm for 
nearly 50 years, with several jurisdictions taking the precaution of abolishing 
sedition, including the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia.14 
However, criminal offences are not subject to desuetude and are always capable 
of resuscitation and redeployment against new threats. The revival of interest in 
sedition in 2005 was a direct response to recent terrorist attacks, and was 
presented as part of a package of counter-terrorism measures by the Howard 
Government.15 Significantly, this remodelling of sedition did not form part of the 
wider reform project of codification and harmonisation stimulated by the Model 
Criminal Code project which is underway in Australia.16 
Sedition is a ‘political crime’, which, as Roger Douglas points out, has been 
used throughout history to ‘punish people for what they think (or what they are 
thought to think) rather than on the basis of the degree to which their activities 
actually pose a threat to social order (however defined).’17 This is aptly demon-
strated by the prosecution of Communist Party members for sedition in the 
period 1948–53.18 The last successful prosecution in 1950 resulted in the 
conviction and imprisonment of William Fardon Burns, the publisher of the 
Communist newspaper, The Tribune. His crime was publishing a series of 
 
 12 Seditious libel emerged as a distinct offence in the English Star Chamber in the 17th century: 
ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 49–52. Charges were brought during the colonial period to 
deal with individuals, including prominent lawyers and newspaper editors, who criticised vari-
ous institutions of government, such as Governors and judges: see G D Woods, A History of 
Criminal Law in New South Wales: The Colonial Period 1788–1900 (2002) 50–6. On the history 
of sedition in Australia, see Michael Head, ‘Sedition — Is the Star Chamber Dead?’ (1979) 3 
Criminal Law Journal 89, 93–9; Laurence W Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of Sedition’ (1992) 14 
Sydney Law Review 287; Laurence W Maher, ‘Dissent, Disloyalty and Disaffection: Australia’s 
Last Cold War Sedition Case’ (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 1; Roger Douglas, ‘The Ambigu-
ity of Sedition: The Trials of William Fardon Burns’ (2004) 9 Australian Journal of Legal His-
tory 227, 247–8. 
 13 The recent revival of interest in sedition caught most commentators off guard: see, eg, Simon 
Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (1st ed, 2001) 806–7. 
 14 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 83, citing Law Reform (Abolitions and Repeals) Act 1996 
(ACT) s 4 and Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) sch 11. 
 15 See, eg, comments by the Attorney-General in support of the Anti-Terrorism Bill [No 2] 2005 
(Cth), when called by the Deputy Speaker to summarise the Second Reading debate: 
The purpose of these provisions is to modernise the existing provisions designed to criminal-
ise the making of comments where they consist of urging the use of force or violence against 
our democratic and generally tolerant society here in Australia. Sedition has become a more 
relevant offence. 
  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 November 2005, 88 
(Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General). 
 16 For a review of this project from the perspective of an insider, see M R Goode, ‘Constructing 
Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (2002) 26 Criminal Law Journal 152. For 
a critical evaluation of its impact and the principles governing interpretation of the Criminal 
Code, see Miriam Gani, ‘Codifying the Criminal Law: Implications for Interpretation’ (2005) 29 
Criminal Law Journal 264. 
 17 Douglas, above n 12, 248. See also Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of Sedition’, above n 12, 295, 
stating that ‘[a]rchival and other evidence amply demonstrates that sedition is invariably used in 
an oppressive manner. In twentieth century Australia the history of the law of sedition is a his-
tory of repeated injustice meted out to left wing radicals.’ 
 18 For excellent accounts, see Douglas, above n 12; Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of Sedition’, 
above n 12. 
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articles, which contained the seditious slogan, ‘Not a Man, Not a Ship, Not a 
Plane, Not a Gun for the Aggressive Imperialist War on Korea and Malaya’.19 
Although the Commonwealth succeeded at the trial and the appeal,20 this 
shameful litigation, which coincided with the passage of the Communist Party 
Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth), attracted considerable media attention and cast doubt 
upon the legality of the involvement of Australia in the war. Following failed 
prosecutions in 1953,21 the Commonwealth accordingly reassessed its strategy in 
the use of sedition for subsequent cases. Significantly, sedition was not deployed 
against the perceived communist threat and anti-war protests during the Vietnam 
era.22 
In late 2005, the existing sedition provisions in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
(‘Crimes Act’) were repealed and new sedition offences were inserted into the 
Criminal Code. Reflecting its historical associations with treason, sedition is 
included in Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code, titled ‘The Security of the Com-
monwealth’, under Part 5.1 which is titled ‘Treason and Sedition’. The new 
sedition offences proscribe urging others to engage in a range of specified 
behaviours contained in s 80.2. Three of the sedition offences deal with behav-
iours closely aligned to treason, namely, urging others to overthrow the Austra-
lian Constitution, the Commonwealth, or the government (federal, state or 
territory), or urging others to assist the enemy or those engaged in armed 
hostilities.23 Sedition is also directed towards protecting political freedoms more 
widely, proscribing the urging of others to interfere with parliamentary elec-
tions,24 as well as upholding public order by proscribing the urging of violence 
between defined groups.25 While the new sedition offences cover diverse 
territory, they are linked by a common thread of advocacy (or ‘urging’, to use the 
language of the Criminal Code) of violence or force in defined circumstances. 
Framed across these five distinct offences, sedition has a multi-functional 
character and can be deployed against individuals in very different contexts. An 
effect of this multi-functionality is that the rationales underpinning the offences 
 
 19 See, eg, ‘Not a Man, Not a Gun for Monopoly’s Robber War against Malaya’, The Tribune 
(Sydney), 5 May 1950, 2, cited in Douglas, above n 12, 230. 
 20 See also Douglas, above n 12. 
 21 See Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of Sedition’, above n 12, 306–11; Maher, ‘Dissent, Disloyalty 
and Disaffection’, above n 12, 38–41, discussing the unsuccessful prosecutions of Communist 
Party members in 1953 and the opportunities those prosecutions provided for the Common-
wealth to obtain information about Communist Party members. 
 22 Douglas notes that, after the Burns trial, sedition was not used to deal with the more virulent 
Vietnam anti-war protest by unionists which had called for bans on the supply of war materials, 
boycotting of conscription and fundraising for the Vietcong. Rather, anti-war protestors were 
prosecuted for less serious public order offences such as offensive conduct: see Douglas, 
above n 12, 248. See, eg, Ball v McIntyre (1966) 9 FLR 237, in which the police prevented an 
anti-Vietnam protest outside Parliament House in Canberra. Desmond Ball, a university student, 
had climbed on a statue of George V and hung a placard that read: ‘I will not fight in Vietnam’. 
His conviction for offensive behaviour was quashed on appeal. The Supreme Court of the Aus-
tralian Capital Territory ruled that this conduct could not reasonably be regarded as ‘offensive’ in 
light of its obvious political context: see Bronitt and McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law 
(2nd ed), above n 1, 760–1. 
 23 Criminal Code s 80.2(1). 
 24 Criminal Code s 80.2(4). 
 25 Criminal Code s 80.2(5). 
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are blurred, effectively combining competing rationales relating to security and 
anti-discrimination. In light of the wide terrain covered by sedition offences, it is 
doubtful whether the availability of ‘good faith’ or public interest defences is an 
adequate safeguard against over-criminalisation and provides sufficient legal 
protection for those who engage in otherwise legitimate political activity. The 
scope of sedition, which is punishable by seven years of imprisonment,26 should 
not rest on discretionary judgements of prosecutors, judges and juries about the 
perceived ‘legitimacy’ of otherwise seditious behaviour. As Enid Campbell and 
Harry Whitmore pointed out more than 30 years ago, ‘[w]hen the law may have 
such broad application, it is only the executive discretion as to prosecution which 
stands in the way of governmental suppression of unpopular political views.’27 
While there exists a strong culture of police, prosecutorial and judicial independ-
ence in Australia, recent benign history provides no assurance as to future 
practice. In our view, the offences must be confined through clearly and nar-
rowly defined physical and fault elements. 
Clearly the boundaries of criminal liability for sedition must be determined 
and justified at the law creation stage. Core definitions of these offences must 
give careful consideration to their possible impact on the freedom of political 
communication. Criminalisation of ‘offensive speech’ with a political context has 
always been problematic — constitutional law places limits on laws which 
impose unreasonable or disproportionate restraints on the freedom of political 
communication.28 Beyond these constitutional limitations, offensive language 
crimes arouse objections because of their history of discretionary enforcement 
against minorities who verbally resist police authority.29 
It is often said that sedition is a symbolic or political offence. As Douglas 
perceptively observed, the use of sedition prosecutions operates symbolically as 
a political barometer: 
Their use is a guide to what governments are willing to tolerate, and even when 
prosecutions are used sparingly, the fact that they are used at all indicates that 
governments are relatively confident that the political climate is sufficiently 
tolerant of repression for them to be able to get away, not only with political 
prosecutions, but with the more subtle, more ubiquitous, and more effective 
forms of repression which typically accompany prosecutions for political 
crimes.30 
The symbolism of sedition does not dilute its impact, either directly or indi-
rectly. Sedition laws are claimed to have a ‘chilling effect’ on public debate 
which particularly affects the activities of publishers, scholars and political 
organisations critical of government policy. Since Douglas offered his assess-
ment, the potential application of sedition laws has been considered by law 
 
 26 Criminal Code s 80.2. 
 27 Enid Campbell and Harry Whitmore, Freedom in Australia (revised ed, 1973) 329. 
 28 See below Part III(B) for a discussion of the decision in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 
(‘Coleman’), where the High Court considered the compatibility of the Queensland offence of 
using insulting language with the implied freedom of political communication. See also Bronitt 
and McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 759. 
 29 Bronitt and McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 767–8. 
 30 Douglas, above n 12, 248. 
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enforcement agencies in relation to Islamic books dealing with ‘jihadist’ themes. 
While not falling within sedition per se, the Attorney-General referred eight 
books to the Classification Review Board, which subsequently banned two 
Islamic texts, both authored before September 11, dealing with the topic of 
‘violent jihad’.31 This raised concern that an era of political censorship had been 
revived in Australia. Indeed, the role of the media in identifying these ‘Books of 
Hate’32 suggests that the pressure to use sedition may not arise from law en-
forcement quarters, but paradoxically from the media pursuing the ‘public 
interest’. Indeed, the history of sedition in the 1940s demonstrates how the media 
itself, in an effort to expose the threat of communism within Australia, solicited 
public statements of disloyalty from Communist Party members. This was 
demonstrated in R v Sharkey,33 where abstract hypotheticals or propositions were 
contrived in order to induce such statements.34 The current political debate about 
Muslims and their allegiance to Australia suggests that religious and community 
leaders may be subject to similar ‘loyalty testing’ by overzealous investigative 
journalists. 
I I I   THE NEW FORMS OF SEDITION:  OLD WINE IN  NEW BOTTLES? 
When introducing the new sedition provisions into Parliament, the Attor-
ney-General emphasised that the provisions were not a wholesale revision of the 
then existing sedition provisions. Rather, the new provisions were designed to 
modernise language.35 Moreover, as the Explanatory Memorandum emphasised, 
the new provisions were largely based on the recommendations of the Commit-
tee of Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law chaired by the former Chief 
Justice Sir Harry Gibbs (‘Gibbs Committee’).36 However, their central place 
 
 31 Classification Review Board, ‘Classification Review Board Determines 2 Islamic Books Are 
Refused Classification’ (Press Release, 10 July 2006) <http://www.oflc.gov.au/resource.html? 
resource=879>. See also the final decisions of the Classification Review Board in relation to the 
two publications, Defence of Muslim Lands and Join the Caravan, that were refused classifica-
tion: Classification Review Board, Defence of the Muslim Lands (10 July 2006) Office of Film 
and Literature Classification <http://www.oflc.gov.au/resource.html?resource=877&filename= 
877.pdf>; Classification Review Board, Join the Caravan (10 July 2006) Office of Film and 
Literature Classification <http://www.oflc.gov.au/resource.html?resource=873&filename=873. 
pdf>. In recent times, obscenity laws and classification laws have been used more to regulate 
pornography, rather than political ideology: see Bronitt and McSherry, Principles of Criminal 
Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 615. These Classification Review Board decisions to refuse classifica-
tion reflect a greater preparedness on the part of government to exercise control over Islamic 
political and religious material linked to terrorism. ‘Refused Classification’ by the Classification 
Review Board prevents the distribution or importation of these books. See also Norman 
Abjorensen, ‘Strike up the Ban: Censor Joins the War on Terrorism’ (Discussion Paper No 26/06, 
Democratic Audit of Australia, The Australian National University, 2006). 
 32 The ‘Books of Hate’ episode is discussed in ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 220–1, 222. 
 33 (1949) 79 CLR 121 (‘Sharkey’). See further below Part III(A). 
 34 Laurence Louis Sharkey was prosecuted for statements, made during an interview with the 
press, where he said that in the event of a war against the Soviets, ‘Australian workers would 
welcome Soviet Forces’: Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 123; see also Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse 
of Sedition’, above n 12, 301. 
 35 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 3 November 2005, 103 
(Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General). 
 36 Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill [No 2] 2005 (Cth) 88. See H Gibbs, R Watson 
and A Menzies, ‘Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law: Offences Relating to the Security 
and Defence of the Commonwealth’ (Discussion Paper No 8, Committee of Review of Com-
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amongst the raft of new terrorism provisions was undoubted. The Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Legislation Committee recommended that the provisions not 
be enacted until an inquiry was undertaken by the ALRC into the best means of 
preventing the incitement of terrorism.37 The Howard Government, however, did 
not accept those recommendations, preferring that the provisions be enacted 
(with some recommended changes) and the ALRC to conduct a review of the 
provisions after their enactment. 
Broadly speaking, two of the five offences contained within the Criminal Code 
prohibit persons urging others to use force or violence against the constitutional 
system of government. Another two offences, broadly speaking, proscribe 
persons urging others to assist enemies of Australia. Those provisions criminalise 
the following conduct: 
• where a person urges another person to overthrow by force or violence the 
Constitution,38 the government of the Commonwealth, a state or a territory,39 
or the lawful authority of the government of the Commonwealth (s 80.2(1)); 
• where a person urges another person to interfere by force or violence with 
federal parliamentary elections (s 80.2(3)); and 
• where a person urges another person to assist an organisation or country at 
war with the Commonwealth or engage in armed hostilities against the Aus-
tralian Defence Force (s 80.2(7), (8)). 
The offences in s 80.2(1) and (3) are established whether the urging of force or 
violence is intended for the relevant institutions and process of government, or 
whether the person urging the conduct is reckless as to that element of the 
offence.40 The offences in s 80.2(7) and (8) do not apply to engagement in 
conduct by way of, or for the purposes of, the provision of aid of a humanitarian 
nature.41 All the offences in s 80.2 are subject to a ‘good faith’ defence in s 80.3. 
‘Good faith’ encompasses attempts to: 
• show mistakes in government policy, or errors in government or law with a 
view to reform; 
• urge lawful reform; 
 
monwealth Criminal Law, 1988); H Gibbs, R Watson and A Menzies, Review of Commonwealth 
Criminal Law: Fifth Interim Report (1991). 
 37 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of 
the Anti-Terrorism Bill [No 2] 2005 (2005) 115, cited in ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 35. 
 38 As Dixon J recognised in Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101, 115, the word ‘Constitution’ 
‘does not refer to a document or instrument of government but to the polity or organized form of 
government which the fundamental rules of law have established whether they are expressed in a 
written constitution or not.’ 
 39 The word ‘government’ was interpreted by Dixon J ‘to signify the established system of political 
rule, the governing power of the country consisting of the executive and the legislature consid-
ered as an organized entity and independently of the persons of whom it consists from time to 
time’: ibid. An interpretation that would cover persons in political and public offices would give 
the provision ‘an application inconsistent with parliamentary and democratic institutions and 
with the principles of the common law … governing the freedom of criticism and of expression’: 
at ibid. 
 40 Criminal Code s 80.2(2), (4). 
 41 Criminal Code s 80.2(9). 
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• point out matters producing ill will or hostility between different groups;  
• do anything in connection with an industrial dispute or matter; or  
• publish a report about a matter of public interest.42  
The good faith defence will be discussed further in Part V below. 
Prior to their replacement by Criminal Code s 80.2, the sedition provisions 
were contained in s 24D of the Crimes Act. Section 24D made it an offence to 
write, print, utter or publish words expressive of a seditious intention.43 A 
seditious intention included the following purposes: 
• to excite disaffection against the Government or Constitution of the Com-
monwealth or against either House of the Parliament of the Common-
wealth;44 and 
• to excite Her Majesty’s subjects to attempt to procure the alteration, other-
wise than by lawful means, of any matter in the Commonwealth established 
by the law of the Commonwealth.45 
In 1986, the offences of sedition were significantly restricted by amendments 
to the Crimes Act which imposed a fault element into the definition of seditious 
conduct, which had to be carried out with ‘the intention of causing violence or 
creating public disorder or a public disturbance’.46 Section 24A(2) contained a 
range of ‘good faith’ defences similar to Criminal Code s 80.3. 
Three main points may be made about the respective sets of provisions. First, 
in relation to provisions protective of the Commonwealth constitutional frame-
work, the current provisions target the urging of forceful or violent action. In 
contrast, Crimes Act s 24A(d), in its original form, focused more broadly on the 
excitement of disaffection against those institutions.47 As stated by the ALRC, 
the ‘urging’ provisions ‘shift the emphasis from speech that is merely critical of 
the established order to exhortations to use force or violence’.48 Second, the 
relevant provisions in Crimes Act s 24A that were protective of governmental 
institutions were limited to Commonwealth institutions. By contrast, Criminal 
Code s 80.2(1) also seeks to protect the government of a state from a person 
urging its forceful or violent overthrow.49 Third, s 80.2(7) and (8) are new 
provisions, which were not explicitly recommended in those terms by the Gibbs 
 
 42 Criminal Code s 80.3(1). 
 43 When read with the definition of ‘seditious words’ in Crimes Act s 24B. 
 44 Crimes Act s 24A(d). 
 45 Crimes Act s 24A(f). 
 46 Crimes Act ss 24B, 24D, discussed by Gibbs, Watson and Menzies, ‘Review of Commonwealth 
Criminal Law: Offences Relating to the Security and Defence of the Commonwealth’, 
above n 36, 303–4. 
 47 Following a recommendation of the Royal Commission on Australia’s Security and Intelligence 
Agencies, the provisions were amended in 1986 to require proof of an intention to create vio-
lence, public disturbance or disorder: Commonwealth, Royal Commission on Australia’s Secu-
rity and Intelligence Agencies, Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organization 
(1985), cited in ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 60. 
 48 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 62. 
 49 Although it is made clear that the Commonwealth does not seek to exclude the operation of state 
sedition laws. 
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Committee. There was some disagreement in submissions to the ALRC as to 
whether these were entirely new provisions, with the Attorney-General’s 
Department arguing that they were ‘clearly contemplated’ by the former repealed 
provisions.50 Although new in form, at least some of the conduct caught by 
s 80.2(7) or (8) would have been covered by the earlier disaffection provisions. 
As the cases of Burns v Ransley51 and Sharkey52 show, statements in support of 
Soviet hostilities against Australia fell within the disaffection provisions. 
A  Constitutional Power 
The constitutional validity of the former sedition provisions in Crimes Act 
s 24A were upheld by the High Court in Burns v Ransley and Sharkey. In 
Sharkey, the judges unanimously held that Commonwealth legislative power 
extended to the protection of Commonwealth governmental institutions from 
seditious words.53 The power to protect the constitutional framework from force 
or violence is thus reasonably clear. There is little doubt that the Commonwealth 
Parliament has the legislative power to protect the Australian Government, not 
only from conduct involving force or violence, but also from those who urge 
others to use force or violence. The power would also extend to the protection of 
parliamentary elections in Criminal Code s 80.2(3), and to the protection of the 
government of a territory in s 80.2(1).54 
As Dixon J emphasised in Sharkey, however, the power has its limitations. 
These limitations will be explored further below.55 For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to note that this Commonwealth power would not ‘authorize legisla-
tion upon matters which are prima facie within the province of the States upon 
grounds of a connection with Federal affairs that is only tenuous, vague, fanciful 
or remote.’56  
Two points may be made in this regard. First, while the role of recklessness in 
relation to the constitutional elements of the offence potentially removes the 
proscribed conduct from the core territory of federal protection, as Dixon J said, 
Commonwealth power in this respect ‘has always been applied flexibly and 
liberally’ and would probably extend to the proscription of conduct engaged in 
with reckless disregard of its federal effects.57 This is especially the case given 
 
 50 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 226, citing Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism 
Bill [No 2] 2005, 22 November 2005, Submission No 290A, attach A (Attorney-General’s De-
partment). 
 51 (1949) 79 CLR 101. This was an appeal from the conviction of Gilbert Burns. Cf the prosecution 
and conviction of William Fardon Burns discussed previously: see above nn 18–20 and accom-
panying text. 
 52 (1949) 79 CLR 121. 
 53 However, their Honours’ views differed as to the source of that power. Latham CJ, McTiernan 
and Webb JJ referred to the express incidental power in s 51(xxxix): ibid 135 (Latham CJ), 157 
(McTiernan J), 163 (Webb J). Dixon J referred to the implied power arising ‘out of the very 
nature and existence of the Commonwealth as a political institution’: at 148. Rich and Wil-
liams JJ did not specify a head of power: at 145 (Rich J), 159–65 (Williams J). 
 54 Under Australian Constitution s 122. 
 55 See below Part IV(A). 
 56 Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151 (Dixon J). 
 57 Ibid. 
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the narrow subjective meaning of recklessness for these purposes.58 Second, 
unless, as Dixon J said in Sharkey, ‘domestic violence within a State is of such a 
character as to interfere with the operations of the Federal Government, or with 
the rights and privileges of federal citizenship’,59 the Commonwealth has no 
power to interfere to protect against that violence. Thus, there must be at least 
some doubt as to the constitutional power to prohibit the urging of persons under 
Criminal Code s 80.2(2)(b) which is directed to a state government on the basis 
Dixon J’s judgment in Sharkey. It may well be, however, that s 80.2(2)(b) can be 
supported as a provision enacted under the external affairs power for the purpose 
of implementing international obligations to prohibit incitement to commit a 
terrorist act.60 
B  Implied Freedom of Political Communication and Interpretive Uncertainties 
The High Court sedition cases of Burns v Ransley and Sharkey preceded the 
development of the implied freedom of political communication. Despite some 
continuing dissatisfaction with its existence,61 it is reasonably settled that an 
implied constitutional limitation on Commonwealth and state legislative and 
executive powers derives from the provisions of the Australian Constitution that 
create the Commonwealth system of representative and responsible government 
and the process for federal referenda.62 The limitation protects political commu-
nication that is relevant to those federal constitutional institutions and processes 
to the extent necessary for their effective operation.63 The protection, however, is 
not absolute, and there will be circumstances where political communication 
may be burdened in pursuit of other public interests. In many important respects, 
the dimensions of the constitutional protection are unclear or unresolved, and its 
application in some contexts is difficult to predict.64 However, it has developed 
sufficiently such that a number of initial observations can be made as to the 
compatibility of the sedition provisions with the implied freedom. 
 
 58 See Criminal Code s 5.4. 
 59 (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151. 
 60 See ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 104, where the binding nature of United Nations Security 
Council decisions on Australia, as a member state of the United Nations, is discussed. 
 61 See, eg, the judgments of Callinan J: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats 
Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 338–9; Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 101–2; Coleman (2004) 
220 CLR 1, 88; APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales (2005) 224 CLR 
322, 477 (‘APLA’). 
 62 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 (‘Lange’). Prior to Lange, 
there were differing views as to the constitutional foundation for the implied freedom. However, 
in Lange, the High Court held that the freedom was firmly grounded in the text of the Australian 
Constitution. 
 63 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 561 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow 
and Kirby JJ). 
 64 In the context of copyright, see Robert Burrell and James Stellios, ‘Copyright and Freedom of 
Political Communication in Australia’ in Jonathan Griffiths and Uma Suthersanen (eds), Copy-
right and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (2005) 257, 257. In relation to 
racial and religious vilification laws, see Nicholas Aroney, ‘The Constitutional (In)validity of 
Religious Vilification Laws: Implications for Their Interpretation’ (2006) 34 Federal Law Re-
view 287; Dan Meagher, ‘What is “Political Communication”? The Rationale and Scope of the 
Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 
438. 
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When determining the compatibility of a provision with the implied freedom, 
the test adopted unanimously by the High Court in Lange, as modified by a 
majority in Coleman,65 asks two questions: 
First, does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about gov-
ernment or political matters either in its terms, operation or effect? Second, if 
the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and 
adapted to serve a legitimate end [in a manner66] which is compatible with the 
maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and re-
sponsible government … If the first question is answered ‘yes’ and the second 
is answered ‘no’, the law is invalid.67 
To take the easiest question first, there is no doubt the sedition provisions 
would be seen as pursuing legitimate interests. As indicated, the enactment of 
s 80.2 of the Criminal Code has shifted the focus of the provisions to the 
prevention of force or violence. Assuming the provisions are otherwise within 
federal power, preventing the risk of force or violence against governmental 
institutions and processes would be viewed as directed towards legitimate ends. 
In Coleman, the state provisions in question prohibited the use of ‘threatening, 
abusive or insulting words’ to any person in a public place.68 All judges accepted 
that the prevention of violence was a legitimate end to be pursued by the legisla-
tion. McHugh J stated that ‘[r]egulating political statements for the purpose of 
preventing breaches of the peace by those provoked by the statements is an end 
that is compatible with the system of representative government established by 
the Constitution.’69 Although the Court was specifically concerned with violence 
towards a person engaged in provocative conduct, the rationale is equally 
applicable to the provocation of violence towards others. Furthermore, the 
protection of Commonwealth electoral processes,70 and the prevention of 
persons assisting the enemy,71 would be seen as legitimate government interests. 
The questions of whether these laws burden political communication, and 
whether the provisions are reasonably appropriate and adapted to a legitimate 
end, will depend, significantly, on how they are interpreted. The ALRC high-
lighted a range of interpretive difficulties with the sedition provisions, some of 
which go to the fault elements that have to be shown, while others go to the 
 
 65 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 30 (McHugh J), 57 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 61–2 (Kirby J). 
Despite a clear acceptance of that change by a majority of the Court, the altered test was not 
applied by the other three judges in the subsequent case of APLA (2005) 224 CLR 322. 
 66 The wording in parentheses was altered by a majority of the High Court in Coleman (2004) 220 
CLR 1, 30–1 (McHugh J), 57 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 62 (Kirby J). 
 67 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567–8 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ) (citations omitted). The Court in Lange said the ‘reasonably appropriate 
and adapted’ test is more or less equivalent to the test of proportionality: at 567 fn 272. How-
ever, it is unlikely that the use of the idea of proportionality squares precisely with the way in 
which that concept is used in international or comparative human rights jurisprudence. 
 68 (2004) 220 CLR 1, 8 (Gleeson CJ). 
 69 Ibid 33. 
 70 Criminal Code s 80.2(3). See also Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 
177 CLR 106; Langer v Commonwealth (1996) 186 CLR 302. 
 71 For comments regarding the protection of national security, see, eg, Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 
32 (McHugh J). 
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meaning of the expressions used in the provisions to describe the physical 
elements and defences. 
In broad terms, the new offences of sedition subscribe to the general principle 
in the criminal law that serious crimes require proof of intention, a presumption 
reflected both in the common law and the principles of criminal responsibility in 
the Criminal Code. Under the Criminal Code, the default provisions, which 
apply where the fault element is unspecified, require proof of intention in 
relation to elements of conduct, and recklessness as to the circumstances or 
results specified in the offence.72 Accepting that sedition offences have a broader 
preventative focus than ordinary incitement, the ALRC rejected the argument 
that the ‘urging’ must relate to a specific terrorist act or other crime.73 For the 
purpose of sedition, the fault element need only relate to the use of force or 
violence in general terms. 
An arena of controversy, however, arises in relation to the scope of that fault 
element. For some offences, recklessness in relation to defined circumstances or 
results is included as an express fault element. The Attorney-General’s Depart-
ment argues that, outside these cases, the ordinary presumption of fault in the 
Criminal Code operates. In its view, the offences of sedition are ‘conduct 
crimes’, and thus all that must be proved is that the conduct element (namely, the 
‘urging’) was intentional.74 
The ALRC took a different view, recommending that the provisions be 
amended to insert the word ‘intentionally’ before the word ‘urges’ to clarify the 
fault element applicable to urging the use of force or violence.75  
In our view, the placement of the adverb ‘intentionally’ does not achieve this 
objective, and may indeed promote ambiguity. The ALRC claims that the term 
‘intentionally’ relates not only to the conduct element, but also to the results (the 
use of force or violence which is being urged).76 However, to achieve the latter 
objective unambiguously — and to avoid the possibility that a court may 
interpret the offence as one of recklessness as to the results under s 5.6 of the 
Criminal Code — the offence should have framed the intention requirement 
expressly, stating ‘the person must intend that the urged force or violence will 
occur’. This way of framing the intention element would be consistent with the 
 
 72 Criminal Code s 5.6. 
 73 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 174. 
 74 See Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill [No 2] 2005, 22 November 
2005, Submission No 290A (Attorney-General’s Department); Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill [No 2] 2005, above n 37, 99–100, 
cited in ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 178. 
 75 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 181. The Attorney-General’s Department resisted inclusion 
of the word ‘intentionally’ as superfluous in light of Criminal Code s 5.6, which arguably has the 
same effect: Submission to ALRC, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia, 3 
July 2006, Submission No 92 (Attorney-General’s Department), cited in ALRC, Fighting Words, 
above n 6, 180. 
 76 See Recommendation 8–1: ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 176. The Attorney-General and 
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions opposed the recommendation, citing eviden-
tial difficulties in relation to proving this state of mind: at 175. The ALRC rejected this argu-
ment, noting the seriousness of the offence and that the Crown is obliged to prove intention for 
many similar offences: at 175. 
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earlier 1986 amendment of the sedition offence which, as noted above, required 
‘an intention of causing violence’.77 
The desirability of construing sedition as an offence requiring an intention as 
to a result (not merely as to conduct or circumstance) is highlighted by the High 
Court’s approach in regard to sedition provisions.78 When dealing with the 
provisions in their previous form, a majority of the High Court took a broad view 
of what conduct constituted the excitement of disaffection. For example, Rich J 
in Burns v Ransley and Sharkey held that to ‘excite’ disaffection included to 
‘inspire or kindle’ disaffection.79 Latham CJ appeared to take the view that the 
‘statement of an abstract theoretical opinion’ or ‘a set of abstract intellectual 
propositions which had no relation to action by any person or persons’ would not 
have been covered by the prohibitions.80 However, his Honour (along with 
Rich J) held that the hypothetical nature of the alleged seditious intention did not 
exclude it from the prohibition.81 In contrast, Dixon J thought there had to be a 
‘real intention’, the purpose itself ‘must be a reality’,82 and statements relating to 
a contingency or spoken as a hypothesis would not be caught.83 McTiernan J 
also focused on the actual purpose of the speaker in the context, rather than ‘the 
tendency of the words or the result which they are calculated to produce’.84  
A statutory majority of the Court in Burns v Ransley (Latham CJ and Rich J) 
held that the statements made by a representative of the Australian Communist 
Party during a public debate were caught by the sedition provisions.85 The 
statements were in response to questions pressed by the media, and were to the 
effect that Australian Communist Party members would fight on the side of 
Soviet Russia in the event of a future war. Intention as to a result — namely the 
occurrence of violence or force — may assist in limiting the scope of the 
offence, excluding statements which only have a remote or fanciful connection 
with the use of violence or force being targeted by the offence. 
Another deficiency with the new offences is that there is no requirement of 
immediacy or likelihood of the urged force or violence occurring.86 Thus, urgings 
will be caught if intended to cause the force or violence, even if it is entirely 
unlikely or even fanciful that the force or violence would result. These questions 
of ‘proximity and degree’ have troubled courts when addressing incitement-type 
offences.87 The United States Supreme Court has had difficulty developing and 
applying a test to accommodate free speech interests protected by the First 
Amendment and the competing public interest in preventing violent conduct. In 
 
 77 See above n 46 and accompanying text. 
 78 See also Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of Sedition’, above n 12, 313–16, discussing the provisions 
in their previous forms. 
 79 Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101, 112; Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 145. 
 80 Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 140. 
 81 See Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101, 108 (Latham CJ), 111 (Rich J). 
 82 Ibid 115–16. 
 83 Ibid 117–18. 
 84 Ibid 119. 
 85 Ibid 109 (Latham CJ), 112 (Rich J). 
 86 Cf Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of Sedition’, above n 12, 313–16, discussing the provisions in 
their previous form. 
 87 Schenck v United States, 249 US 47, 52 (Holmes J) (1919). 
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trying to draw the line between constitutionally protected speech and the 
unlawful incitement of violence, the Supreme Court has moved from a ‘clear and 
present danger’ test88 to a balancing model,89 and finally, to the test in Branden-
burg v Ohio that asks whether the speech is ‘directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.’90 Lower 
Australian courts have also struggled with the same questions when dealing with 
constitutional arguments about religious and racial vilification legislation.91 The 
ALRC considered that these concerns would be addressed indirectly by its 
recommendation for the inclusion of a requirement that there be an intention that 
the urged force or violence occur.92 The introduction of tests of imminence or 
reasonable likelihood of violence would, in the view of the ALRC, introduce 
additional complexity.93 With respect, we disagree. Imminence is a legal concept 
that is used widely both in constitutional and criminal law, and plays a signifi-
cant role in defining other public order powers and offences relating to breach of 
the peace.94 
In relation to the prohibitions in Criminal Code s 80.2(7) and (8), the main 
concern of the ALRC was the breadth of the word ‘assist’. In its view, ‘assisting 
an organisation or country’ could be interpreted or applied ‘to proscribe legiti-
mate political protest, and punish merely rhetorical encouragement or support for 
those who disagree with Australian government policy’, and extend to prohibit 
the urging of lawful conduct.95 The ALRC also recommended that s 80.2(7) and 
(8) be repealed, and that a provision relating to assistance be relocated to the 
treason offence in s 80.1(1), with the clarification that only ‘material’ assistance 
is intended to be caught and that the assistance must enable an enemy ‘to engage 
in war’ with the Commonwealth or ‘to engage in armed hostilities’ against the 
Australian Defence Force.96 
Compatibility with the implied freedom of political communication will also 
depend upon the scope of the defences. Many of the ‘good faith’ defences,97 on 
their face, appear to be directed at protecting political communication. Thus, 
provided there is ‘good faith’, a person can (most relevantly for present pur-
poses): 
• try to show that the sovereign, Governor-General, Governors or others 
referred to in s 80.3(a) are mistaken;  
 
 88 Ibid. 
 89 Dennis v United States, 341 US 494 (1951). 
 90 395 US 444, 447 (Burger CJ, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall JJ) (1969) 
(emphasis added). See the discussion of these movements in Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional 
Law, Principles and Policies (2nd ed, 2002) 954–67. 
 91 See Aroney, above n 64; Meagher, above n 64. 
 92 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 185. 
 93 Ibid. 
 94 Forbutt v Blake (1981) 51 FLR 465, 469–70 (Connor ACJ), discussed in Bronitt and McSherry, 
Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 730. 
 95 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 230; see also at 116. 
 96 See Recommendation 11–1: ibid 231; Recommendation 11–2: at 234. 
 97 See further below Part V, where the defence in Criminal Code s 80.3 is set out in full. 
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• point out errors or defects in the government, legislation or administration of 
justice at the federal, state or territory level under s 80.3(b) with a view to 
reforming those errors or defects;  
• urge another person to lawfully procure legal or administrative change at the 
federal, state or territory level under s 80.3(c); and  
• publish a report or commentary about a matter of public interest under 
s 80.3(h).  
In considering the earlier ‘good faith’ defences, Latham CJ in Burns v Ransley 
certainly thought that they were protective of political criticism and opposition.98 
Various submissions to the ALRC highlighted the potential limits of the de-
fences for protecting political communication.99 For example, it is unclear 
whether ‘publishing’ in s 80.3(h) would protect oral comment or reporting, or 
whether a ‘report or commentary’ would cover artistic expression or satire.100 
Furthermore, the defence in s 80.3(1)(b), which requires that the communication 
be made ‘with a view to reforming those errors or defects’, might be said to be 
limited to ‘constructive forms of expression’, and thus not cover political satire 
or irony.101 The same might be said for the necessary condition of ‘good faith’ 
for all the defences.102 
The clearest indication from the High Court on the areas of sedition and politi-
cal communication come from its decision in Coleman.103 As indicated, the 
Court in Coleman considered the validity of a prohibition on the use of ‘insult-
ing’ words in a public place. The charges stemmed from Patrick Coleman’s 
personal campaign against alleged police corruption where he distributed 
pamphlets that named several police officers who, in his view, were corrupt. 
When Coleman was distributing the pamphlets, a police officer named in one of 
the pamphlets approached him and an altercation followed in which Coleman 
said, ‘this is Constable Brendan Power, a corrupt police officer.’104 He was 
convicted of using insulting words in a public place, contrary to Vagrants, 
Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) s 7(1)(d).105 A four-member majority 
held the prohibition did not apply to the words of Coleman. Three of the four 
 
 98 (1949) 79 CLR 101, 109. 
 99 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 251. 
100 Ibid 249–52. 
101 Cf in Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 26, where McHugh J states that ‘[i]nsults are as much a part 
of communications concerning political and government matters as is irony, humour or acerbic 
criticism’. Kirby J held that the constitutional system of government ‘belongs as much to the 
obsessive, the emotional and the inarticulate as it does to the logical, the cerebral and the re-
strained’: at 79. McHugh J has also stated in Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 623, that the 
freedom ‘protects false, unreasoned and emotional communications as well as true, reasoned and 
detached communications’. Toohey and Gummow JJ made a similar point: at 613. As to whether 
political satire can be protected by the implied freedom, see Australian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion v Hanson [1998] QCA 306 (Unreported, de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P and McPherson JA, 28 
September 1998); cf Brander v Ryan (2000) 78 SASR 234. 
102 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 249–52. 
103 See generally Bronitt and McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 758–60. 
104 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 21 (Gleeson CJ). 
105 The Queensland Parliament has since repealed this provision: see Vagrants, Gaming and Other 
Offences Act 1931 (Qld) s 7AA. This Act has since been repealed in its entirety by the Summary 
Offences Act 2005 (Qld). 
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judges in the majority (Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ) interpreted the word 
‘insulting’ narrowly, only to cover words ‘intended to provoke unlawful physical 
retaliation, or were reasonably likely to do so’.106 Their Honours’ conclusion on 
that narrow construction was reinforced by the existence of the implied free-
dom,107 with strong suggestions that broader interpretations would breach the 
constitutional limitation.108 
The other member of the majority, McHugh J, interpreted the word ‘insulting’ 
more broadly to cover the use of words ‘calculated to hurt the personal feelings 
of a person and [which] did affect the feelings of that person’.109 On this basis, 
his Honour held the unqualified prohibition on the use of insulting words (which 
would include political communication) could not be justified by the objective of 
preventing a breach of the peace and was therefore invalid. Without being 
prescriptive of what might meet constitutional requirements, his Honour indi-
cated that ‘the law would have to make proof of a breach of the peace and the 
intention to commit the breach elements of the offence.’110 
Thus, in the analogous context of criminalising ‘fighting words’,111 the judges 
identified different dimensions of the communication process as falling beyond 
constitutional protection. Gummow and Hayne JJ, with Kirby J agreeing, seemed 
to identify either the intention of the speaker or the reasonable likelihood of the 
effect as elements that can be criminalised.112 On the other hand, McHugh J 
seemed to identify both an actual impact and intention as legislative require-
ments before a sanction could apply free of constitutional constraints.113 Of 
course, given the nature of the issue in Coleman, and the way in which their 
Honours resolved the questions through statutory interpretation, the majority 
judges were not required to push these conditions further. In particular, they were 
not called on to consider issues of ‘proximity and degree’ of the disorder 
apprehended. 
In applying the implied freedom to the federal sedition provisions, the High 
Court will have to identify, with greater precision, the particular dimensions of 
the communication process that could be subject to prohibition. It will also have 
to engage with the problem of the point at which a communication will cease to 
be relevantly ‘political’ and transform into a communication that is beyond 
constitutional protection (which did not have to be addressed in Coleman). 
Defining the relevantly ‘political’ is something that the High Court has so far 
been reluctant to do.114 
 
106 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 54 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 67 (Kirby J). 
107 Ibid 54 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 71 (Kirby J). 
108 Ibid 58 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 70 (Kirby J). 
109 Ibid 20 (McHugh J). 
110 Ibid 34. 
111 This is the way in which these types of laws are characterised in the US: see Chaplinsky v New 
Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942). The ALRC appears to have applied that label to sedition-type 
offences: see ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6. In the US, these are commonly known as cases 
involving ‘advocacy of illegal action’. 
112 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 54 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 67 (Kirby J). 
113 Ibid 34. 
114 Adrienne Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of Political 
Communication’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 374, 378–83; see further Adri-
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However in the end, as the ALRC concluded, the sedition provisions are 
probably valid for two reasons. First, they do not burden political communica-
tion (on the assumption that the urging of the use of force or violence, or the 
giving of assistance to our enemies to engage in hostilities, cannot be character-
ised as relevantly political). Second, even if there is such a burden, the provi-
sions are reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving their legitimate end.115 
Their focus on the prevention of the use of force and violence, or assistance to 
Australia’s enemies, is probably sufficiently narrow (as was the case in Cole-
man) to justify the prohibitions, even if they do catch the odd constitutionally 
protected communication. This would especially be the case if the High Court 
consciously interprets the prohibitions narrowly with sensitivity to the requisite 
fault elements and issues of proximity and degree (as was the case in the 
judgments of Dixon and McTiernan JJ in Burns v Ransley), and if it takes a 
generous view of the ‘good faith’ defences (a statutory dimension absent in 
Coleman). 
IV  URGING INTER-GROUP VIOLENCE:  SEDITION WITH AN IDENTITY 
CRISIS? 
Urging violence in the community, according to Criminal Code s 80.2(5), is a 
new offence, although it bears considerable conceptual similarity to s 24A(1) of 
the Crimes Act. The latter offence, which was one form of seditious intent, 
required the promotion of ‘feelings of ill-will and hostility between different 
classes of His Majesty’s subjects so as to endanger the peace, order or good 
government of the Commonwealth’.116 
The language of this offence was anomalous and outdated. The Attor-
ney-General’s Department strongly supported the case for modernisation, 
claiming that this wording addressed only incitement of unrest between different 
‘social classes’.117 It followed that on this view, the offence had no application to 
the incitement of violence between groups distinguished on other grounds such 
as race, religion, nationality or political opinion. This ‘class conflict’ reading of 
seditious intent is overly restrictive. Historical research reveals that the 19th 
century common law (upon which subsequent statutory definitions were 
developed in the 20th century) conceived this form of seditious intent to deal 
specifically with Irish nationalist agitation against British rule.118 Clearly then, 
 
enne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited’ (2005) 28 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 842; Meagher, above n 64. 
115 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 143–6. 
116 See Crimes Act s 24A(1)(g). This offence was inserted into the Crimes Act in 1920, following 
the classic definition of ‘seditious intention’ contained in Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest 
of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments) (4th ed, 1887). See further ALRC, Fighting 
Words, above n 6, 27–8, 47–8. 
117 Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inquiry into the Provisions of 
the Anti-Terrorism Bill [No 2] 2005, 16 November 2005, Submission No 290, 4 (Attor-
ney-General’s Department). 
118 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 202–3, notes that the definition in Stephen, above n 116, was 
influenced by O’Connell v The Queen (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 155; 8 ER 1061, in which the defen-
dants were prosecuted successfully for conspiring to promote feelings of ill will and hostility 
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this earlier form of sedition could in fact criminalise incitement of violence 
between groups distinguished by race, religion, nationality or political opinion. 
That said, the new sedition offence in the Criminal Code is a significant im-
provement on the earlier definition. Under s 80.2(5), a person commits an 
offence, and faces seven years’ imprisonment, if: 
(a) the person urges a group or groups (whether distinguished by race, relig-
ion, nationality or political opinion) to use force or violence against an-
other group or other groups (as so distinguished); and 
(b) the use of the force or violence would threaten the peace, order and good 
government of the Commonwealth. 
The new offence borrows heavily from the recommendations of the Gibbs 
Committee.119 It has narrowed the physical element, replacing the language of 
‘disaffection’ (such as feelings of ill will and hostility) with ‘urging force or 
violence’. It has also clarified the meaning of ‘classes’ of subjects in the offence 
by reframing the definition in terms of specified groups.  
A  ‘Constitutional Pegs’ 
As noted by the ALRC, this form of sedition has ‘two possible constitutional 
pegs’.120 One peg is domestic, linked to promoting security within the Com-
monwealth. The other peg is international, linked to the external affairs power of 
the Australian Constitution and various anti-discrimination obligations imposed 
by international law. Melding these two federal objects into a single provision 
pulls the offence in different directions, affecting both its form and scope. For 
reasons discussed below, we believe a federal offence of sedition that targets 
urging force or violence between groups is unnecessary; such an offence, if 
required, should be aligned to anti-discrimination law and addressed through 
state or territory provisions.121 Our position differs from the view of the ALRC, 
which takes the view that this behaviour may be conceived as a public order 
offence, albeit one with a federal dimension.122 
The present offence in s 80.2(5) reflects the federal dimension, by linking the 
urging of force or violence to the security of the Commonwealth. This linkage is 
achieved through inclusion of the clumsy, albeit constitutionally familiar, phrase 
 
between the English and the Irish. See also ALRC at 202–3 which discusses Boucher v The King 
[1951] SCR 265, 293–4 (Kellock J). 
119 The influence of the Gibbs Committee on the definition is acknowledged in Explanatory 
Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill [No 2] 2005 (Cth) 88. See generally ALRC, Fighting Words, 
above n 6, 32. 
120 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 32. Whether the implied freedom of political communication 
might operate to limit the operation of Criminal Code s 80.2(5) will depend upon similar consid-
erations to those discussed in above Part III(B). 
121 Racially motivated violence is a significant manifestation of discrimination: Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission, Racist Violence: Report of the National Inquiry into Racist 
Violence (1991). 
122 The ALRC has proposed the alternate position, viewing the offence of inciting inter-group 
violence as a public order offence of the Commonwealth: ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 
222. 
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‘the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth.’123 Since its 
inclusion as a federal offence in 1920, the sedition provisions have included this 
limb, which draws directly upon the plenary powers phrase in s 51 of the 
Australian Constitution. The phrase enumerates the heads of Commonwealth 
power: ‘The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make 
laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with 
respect to [the relevant head of power]’. 
The inclusion of this constitutional limb in Crimes Act s 24A(1)(g) was sub-
jected to close scrutiny by Dixon J in Sharkey.124 Although his Honour joined the 
rest of the Court in upholding the validity of the other sedition provisions, he 
dissented as to the validity of s 24A(1)(g). Having emphasised the need for a 
connection between the law and federal government, his Honour said: 
Unless in some way the functions of the Commonwealth are involved or some 
subject matter within the province of its legislative power or there is some 
prejudice to the security of the Federal organs of government to be feared, 
ill-will and hostility between different classes of His Majesty’s subjects are not 
a matter with respect to which the Commonwealth may legislate. Such feelings 
or relations among the people form a matter of internal order and fall within the 
province of the States.125 
Section 119 of the Australian Constitution, as Dixon J highlighted, provides 
for Commonwealth protection of every state against invasion and, on the 
application of the executive of the state, against domestic violence. Thus, unless 
there is an application by a state, ‘it is not within the province of the Common-
wealth to protect the State against domestic violence.’126  
It was in this context that Dixon J examined the words ‘so as to endanger the 
peace, order or good government of the Commonwealth’ in s 24A(1)(g). Having 
considered the various meanings of the words ‘the Commonwealth’, his Honour 
concluded that 
[t]he words are … incapable of any definite meaning which would provide the 
necessary connection with the subjects of Federal power, with the administra-
tion of the Federal Government or with the security of any of its institutions. …  
… it describes no definite thing or state of fact capable of connecting the utter-
ance with a subject of Commonwealth power or any of the affairs of the Com-
monwealth.127 
The other judges upheld the validity of s 24A(1)(g), seemingly accepting that 
the provision’s textual connection to the Commonwealth was sufficient to bring 
the provision within power. Only Williams J expressed some concern, but was 
 
123 Crimes Act s 24A(1)(g) used the phrase ‘endanger the peace, order or good government of the 
Commonwealth’. It is unclear whether the use of ‘or’ rather than ‘and’ was a drafting error. In 
Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 153, Dixon J considered that the change of word made ‘no real 
alteration in the meaning of the phrase’, perhaps instead pointing ‘to the necessity of considering 
separately and distributively the elements that go to make up the welfare of the people.’ 
124 (1949) 79 CLR 121, 149–51. 
125 Ibid 150. 
126 Ibid 151. 
127 Ibid 153–4. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — page 943 of 38
  
2006] Sedition, Security and Human Rights 943 
     
content to uphold its validity on the basis that ‘the Commonwealth’ was to be 
read as referring to the Commonwealth as a body politic, and not in the geo-
graphical sense.128  
Despite the majority view in Sharkey, there is great strength in Dixon J’s 
contention that the expression ‘the peace, order or good government of the 
Commonwealth’ is devoid of definite meaning necessary to bring s 80.2(5) 
within Commonwealth power. As his Honour said: 
What is the element for which you are to look in the definition of the crime? 
What is the specific connection with the affairs of the Federal Government 
which must exist in fact and must be endangered by the seditious words? It is 
impossible to define it.129 
As a result, some doubt remains as to whether s 80.2(5) could be supported on 
the basis accepted by the majority in Sharkey. 
The constitutional limb of sedition frames the urging of violence or force 
against the Commonwealth as the paramount harm, directing attention away from 
the harm this type of incitement poses for individuals and groups targeted by 
discriminatory violence.130 It constrains the offence significantly as the prosecu-
tion must prove that the urging of force or violence between groups would 
threaten ‘the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth’. In terms 
of both scale and effect, this means that the prosecution would need to prove that 
the violence urged would impinge upon the security of the Commonwealth. This 
would arguably rule out its application to small-scale and localised intrastate 
violence, such as the recent race riots in Cronulla, Sydney, in 2005.131 Notwith-
standing this limitation, the ALRC favoured retention of the ‘peace, order and 
good government’ phrase, noting that ‘[n]ot every incident of civil unrest 
requires federal intervention’ and that there were other state and territory 
vilification laws applicable in these situations.132 
The second peg upon which the constitutionality of the offence rests is related 
to various international human rights treaty obligations. As the Gibbs Committee 
noted,133 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that 
 
128 Ibid 159–60. 
129 Ibid 154. 
130 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 212–16, noting the concerns of the Fitzroy Legal Service and 
the Public Interest Advocacy Centre. 
131 A point made in ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 219. The Cronulla race riots began on 11 
December 2005 when an estimated mob of 5000 gathered at Cronulla Beach, and attacked per-
sons of Middle Eastern appearance. Retaliatory attacks in Cronulla and surrounding suburbs 
occurred until order was restored. The racially-driven violence sent shock waves throughout the 
Australian community. See the report from a national symposium on understanding the causes 
and impacts of the Cronulla riots: Centre for Multicultural and Community Development, Uni-
versity of the Sunshine Coast and Multi-Faith Centre, Griffith University, Responding to Cro-
nulla: Rethinking Multiculturalism (2006) <http://www.usc.edu.au/NR/rdonlyres/F22784F0- 
05D0-45E1-B984-B75A7F1D2467/0/Cronulla SymposiumProceedingsFinal.pdf>. For media 
coverage, see, eg, ABC Television, ‘Riot and Revenge’, Four Corners, 13 March 2006 <http:// 
www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2006/s1590953.htm>. 
132 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 219. 
133 Gibbs, Watson and Menzies, Fifth Interim Report, above n 36, 306. 
   
M.U.L.R. — For Final Proof — page 944 of 38
  
944 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 30 
     
‘[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.’134 
This obligation is further bolstered by the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,135 which imposes on state 
parties an obligation to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to 
eradicate all incitement of racial discrimination, or acts of racial discrimination 
and, inter alia, to: 
declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of 
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of an-
other colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist 
activities, including the financing thereof …136 
Despite the superficial similarities with a rights-protective provision, there are 
significant doubts as to whether the validity of s 80.2(5) can be supported as a 
provision enacted for the purpose of implementing international human rights 
obligations. The High Court has allowed the Commonwealth some leeway to 
implement human rights obligations selectively.137 However, as the Court has 
noted, ‘[w]here a treaty relating to a domestic subject matter is relied on to 
enliven the [external affairs power] the validity of the law depends on whether 
its purpose or object is to implement the treaty’.138  
With those observations in mind, the availability of the ICCPR or CERD 
provisions to support s 80.2(5) must be open to some doubt. First, the addition of 
the link to the ‘peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth’ 
significantly narrows the scope of the prohibition in a manner not envisaged by 
these international treaties.139 It was submitted to the ALRC that the words ‘the 
Commonwealth’ could be understood in a geographical sense,140 which might 
broaden the scope of the provision. However, that interpretation would be 
contrary to the observations in Sharkey and would undermine the first peg of 
 
134 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 20(2) (entered into force 23 March 
1976) (‘ICCPR’). 
135 Opened for signature 7 March 1966, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) 
(‘CERD’). 
136 Ibid art 4(a). 
137 Partial implementation of treaty obligations has been accepted by the High Court: see Victo-
ria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 488 (‘Industrial Relations Act Case’). See, eg, Hu-
man Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth) s 4, which seeks partially to implement only the 
privacy provision in the ICCPR by providing that sexual conduct involving consenting adults 
acting in private is not to be subject to any arbitrary interference by the Commonwealth, a state 
or a territory. Although the constitutional validity of the provision was not determined in 
Croome v Tasmania (1997) 191 CLR 119, the Court did not express any indication to the con-
trary. 
138 Industrial Relations Act Case (1996) 187 CLR 416, 487 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, 
McHugh and Gummow JJ). The test to be satisfied for implementation is whether the Common-
wealth provision is ‘reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to achiev-
ing the purpose or object of giving effect to the treaty’: at 488 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, 
McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
139 Ben Saul, ‘Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to Violence’ (2005) 28 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 868, 877. 
140 Gareth Griffith, ‘Sedition, Incitement and Vilification: Issues in the Current Debate’ (Briefing 
Paper No 1, Parliament of New South Wales, 2006) 35, cited in ALRC, Fighting Words, 
above n 6, 211. 
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constitutional support.141 Second, the prohibition on the urging of force or 
violence is only a subset of the international obligations that have a much 
broader focus.142 Third, the group characteristics identified in s 80.2(5) include 
‘political opinion’ — a characteristic not set out in the treaty provisions.143 
Fourth, the prohibition is limited to inter-group force or violence. It does not 
include urgings directed towards individuals or groups not identified by the 
prescribed characteristics, nor would it cover the urging of prescribed group 
violence against individuals or other groups without those characteristics.144 
Taken individually, these points of departure from the treaty obligations might 
fall within the leeway allowed under the external affairs power. However, if 
taken together, there is a strong argument that they demonstrate the divergent 
purposes of s 80.2(5). The acknowledged purpose of s 80.2(5) is to deal with the 
root causes of terrorism. On the other hand, as Ben Saul has argued, ‘[t]he 
rationale for protecting one group from violence by another is not to prevent 
sedition or terrorism, but to guarantee the dignity of the members of human 
groups in a pluralist society’.145 While these are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive objectives, for the purposes of the external affairs power, coincidence 
is not enough: the law must be enacted for the purpose of implementing the 
treaty provisions. Much is revealed by the statement of the Attorney-General’s 
Department to the ALRC that ‘the enactment of s 80.2(5) is consistent with, but 
not required by, Australia’s obligations under international law.’146 This lack of 
purpose is further underscored by the Commonwealth’s reservations to the 
specific provisions of the ICCPR and CERD in respect of anti-vilification 
offences.147 Accordingly, there are some serious doubts as to whether s 80.2(5) 
has the purpose of implementing the obligations in the ICCPR and the CERD, so 
that it can be supported by the external affairs power. 
B  Criminalising Racial Vilification — A Reversal in Policy? 
Until the enactment of s 80.2(5), the Commonwealth exhibited caution in 
adopting a policy of criminalisation for racial vilification. It had rejected the 
Gibbs Committee’s recommendations for a new offence along the lines of 
s 80.2(5), instead addressing its international obligations indirectly by classify-
ing vilification as ‘unlawful discrimination’ under the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cth). Rather than prosecution as envisaged under the ICCPR and CERD, 
 
141 See especially Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 137–8 (Latham CJ), 159 (Williams J). It was 
suggested by the ALRC that a geographical interpretation might have caught the urging of force 
or violence in the Cronulla riots if SMS text messages were sent across state boundaries: ALRC, 
Fighting Words, above n 6, 211–12. It is not clear why the cross-border dimension would be 
necessary for the urgings to fall within the geographical interpretation but, in any event, such an 
interpretation is difficult to square with the observations in Sharkey. 
142 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 212–13. 
143 Saul, above n 139, 878. 
144 See ibid 877; ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 215–16. 
145 Saul, above n 139, 877. 
146 Submission to ALRC, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia, 12 April 2006, 
Submission No 31 (Attorney-General’s Department), cited in ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 
213. 
147 Ibid. 
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federal law promotes a process of conciliation and civil remedies for ‘unlawful 
discrimination’ through the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(with adjudication before the Federal Magistrates Court as a last resort). Com-
mentators have noted that the Commonwealth’s caution in this field signified a 
high degree of sensitivity to free speech, and deference to the legal opinion that 
criminalisation of racial vilification might violate the implied freedom of 
political communication under the Australian Constitution.148 
The 2005 reforms to sedition may be viewed as a partial reversal of Common-
wealth policy. It is clear from the ALRC review that the reversal was not a newly 
found federal commitment to, or re-evaluation of, its international human rights 
obligations, as the reservations to the ICCPR and CERD remain in force. Rather, 
the remodelling of sedition must be understood as a net-widening counter-terror-
ism strategy aimed at criminalising hate speech believed to precipitate acts of 
terrorism. This reticence at the federal level may be contrasted with the position 
in the states and territories (except the Northern Territory), which have enacted a 
range of anti-vilification offences.149 
A person who urges (by written or oral means) the use of force or violence 
between groups based on defined differences (such as race, religion and political 
opinion) is rightly condemned and, as discussed above, a criminal offence 
proscribing such behaviour would probably survive constitutional challenge if it 
were otherwise supported by federal power. With the inclusion of appropriate 
limitations relating to: (a) the inclusion of a fault element based on intention; 
and/or (b) a physical element that requires proof of an imminent risk of force or 
violence, this type of offence would likely survive constitutional challenge 
notwithstanding its potential burden upon the freedom of political communica-
tion. 
C  Definitional Incoherence 
An offence proscribing the urging of inter-group violence grafts an interna-
tional human rights rationale onto a domestic security rationale. Depending on 
which of these two rationales is accorded priority, the offence is either un-
der-inclusive or over-inclusive. From a human rights perspective, the offence 
incorporates some, but not all, of the impermissible grounds for distinguishing 
between individuals recognised in international human rights treaties and 
domestic anti-discrimination law.150 The ALRC has recommended expanding the 
 
148 Luke McNamara, Regulating Racism: Racial Vilification Laws in Australia (2002) 304; Luke 
McNamara and Tamsin Solomon, ‘The Commonwealth Racial Hatred Act 1995: Achievement or 
Disappointment?’ (1996) 18 Adelaide Law Review 259, 281. 
149 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) ss 65–7; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) ss 20C–20D; 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 124A; Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA) s 4; 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) ss 19, 21; Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) 
ss 7, 24; Criminal Code (WA) ss 77–80I. The various legislative models for vilification offences 
enacted in Canada, Europe, New Zealand, New South Wales, the United States and the United 
Kingdom are reviewed in Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Racist Violence, 
above n 121, ch 11. See further ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 196–201. 
150 Cf ICCPR, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 26 (entered into force 
23 March 1976), which states that ‘the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, 
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definition to include one further category of difference, namely ‘national origin’, 
in order to deal with groups which have distinct ‘blended’ identities — that is, 
Australians who were previously foreign nationals, or their descendants, such as 
Vietnamese Australians.151 In addition, the ALRC expressed some reservation 
over the inclusion of urging violence towards groups that are distinguished by 
‘political opinion’, noting arguments that this ground lacks constitutional support 
since it is neither included in art 20 of the ICCPR, nor art 4 of the CERD.152 
Since violence incited against ‘political’ groups constitutes a more direct threat 
to the safety of the Commonwealth and its institutions, firmer constitutional 
ground may be obtained by grounding the offence on its domestic (rather than 
international) constitutional peg. On balance, however, the ALRC has recom-
mended the retention of ‘political opinion’ as a distinguishing factor. 
The broader question not addressed by the ALRC is whether the offence 
should be remodelled, as a matter of policy, to include other group-based 
grounds of distinction recognised by anti-discrimination law, such as sexuality 
and gender. There is a compelling argument that the labelling function of 
criminal law should be used to censure the use of force or violence (including 
inchoate forms of incitement or urging the use of force or violence) that singles 
out vulnerable disadvantaged groups. In relation to sedition, according priority to 
the human rights rationale would have the effect of criminalising the intentional 
urging of violence or force which is rooted in any form of discrimination 
proscribed by international human rights law. This human rights offence would 
signal to both the courts and the wider community that discriminatory motives 
behind violence (including the advocacy of violence) serves to aggravate (rather 
than mitigate) punishment. 
From the security perspective, however, moving beyond the present distin-
guishing grounds would produce an offence which is over-inclusive. While 
supported by human rights principles and criminal justice policy, a difficulty 
arises as to whether these aims could be sensibly accommodated within the 
federal constraints of the offence of sedition. While devastating to the victims 
and their communities, it is doubtful whether ‘hate crimes’ outside the field of 
racist or religious violence would be likely to endanger significantly the security 
of the Commonwealth and its institutions.153 Moreover, rather than extending 
sedition, there is an argument that these behaviours may be more effectively 
addressed through the wide range of anti-vilification offences that have been 
adopted at the state or territory level.154 
 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.’ The Australian Capital Territory and Victoria are the only local jurisdictions thus 
far to have enshrined the right to equality before the law in legislation: Human Rights Act 2004 
(ACT) s 8; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 8. 
151 See Recommendation 10–2: ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 223. 
152 ALRC, Review of Sedition Laws, Discussion Paper, above n 6, 197, 202. 
153 This extension was not considered by the ALRC, reflecting its view that this form of sedition 
was essentially a public order offence: ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 217. 
154 ALRC, Review of Sedition Laws, Discussion Paper, above n 6, 201; see also above n 149 and 
accompanying text. 
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Criminalising ‘hate crimes’ has been much debated among criminal schol-
ars.155 Substantive criminal law generally excludes from consideration the fact 
that a defendant was motivated by hatred, prejudice or bias towards particular 
minorities or disadvantaged groups, notwithstanding that much violence is 
grounded in such motives and constitutes a recurrent theme in many cases 
including homicide. While banished from the substantive criminal law, such 
discriminatory motives may be indirectly considered as factors relevant to 
sentencing. In the United Kingdom, racial or religious hatred towards the victim 
aggravates the penalty for the offence.156 In New South Wales, a broader model 
of sentence aggravation was adopted in 2002, as part of an overhaul of general 
sentencing principles. Under those provisions, matters aggravating a sentence 
include, inter alia, the fact that 
the offence was motivated by hatred for or prejudice against a group of people 
to which the offender believed the victim belonged (such as people of a particu-
lar religion, racial or ethnic origin, language, sexual orientation or age, or hav-
ing a particular disability) …157 
While appearing to be a progressive development from an anti-discrimination 
policy perspective, the political pressure for these new powers stemmed from the 
moral panic about the rise of ‘ethnically’ motivated Lebanese gang rape in 
Sydney.158 
There are two significant limitations with these models. First, the provisions 
confer on the sentencing court a discretion (rather than a duty) to take these 
discriminatory motives into account.159 Second, the provision omits ‘gender’ 
from the protected class. A cursory review of violent offences (murder, rape and 
assault) reveals that ‘domestic violence’ is pervasive, and many serious crimes 
directed towards women are motivated by misogynistic and sexist attitudes.160 
From an anti-discrimination perspective, the exclusion of gender from this list is 
regrettable in light of the continued struggle of the criminal law to regard such 
 
155 For an excellent review of the topic in the Australian context, see Mark Walters, ‘Hate Crimes in 
Australia: Introducing Punishment Enhancers’ (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 201; Chris 
Cunneen, David Fraser and Stephen Tomsen (eds), Faces of Hate: Hate Crime in Australia 
(1997). 
156 Walters, above n 155, 204, discussing the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK) c 37 and 2001 
reforms to the Act, which extended the power to aggravate penalties to religious hatred as part of 
a package of anti-terrorism laws. 
157 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(2)(h), inserted by Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Amendment (General Sentencing Principles) Act 2002 (NSW). See Walters, 
above n 155, 209, where s 21A(2)(h) is discussed. 
158 As Kate Warner has noted, the media played a significant role in constructing the gang rape as 
ethnically motivated, portraying the incidents as young Lebanese gangs targeting victims be-
cause they were ‘Australian’. As well as the sentence enhancement, further aggravated gang rape 
offences were enacted: Kate Warner, ‘Gang Rape in Sydney: Crime, the Media, Politics, Race 
and Sentencing’ (2004) 37 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 344. See also 
Bronitt and McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 598. 
159 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(5) provides: ‘The fact that any such 
aggravating or mitigating factor is relevant and known to the court does not require the court to 
increase or reduce the sentence for the offence.’ 
160 For the available data on the prevalence of domestic violence, see Bronitt and McSherry, 
Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 720. Worse still, in some contexts, these dis-
criminatory beliefs provide foundations for partial defences such as provocation: at 280–1. 
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discriminatory motives and gendered harm as aggravating rather than mitigating 
conditions. 
Recognising the limitations of sedition as an anti-discrimination measure, the 
ALRC proposed that the offence should be reconceived more narrowly, as a 
public order offence.161 Yet, as a public order offence, this provision seems 
under-inclusive. We have already noted the constitutional constraints that require 
the prosecution to establish some threat to the security of the Commonwealth, 
which effectively rules out its application to relatively small-scale and localised 
disorder, such as the Cronulla riots. Further, the offence, reflecting its historical 
antecedents, requires the agitation of force or violence to be directed between 
groups. Thus, advocacy of acts of violence against an individual (albeit arising 
by virtue of his or her membership of a defined group and accompanied by 
discriminatory motives) falls outside the scope of the offence. The inclusion of 
the ‘group-to-group’ limitation has been justified by reference to the counter-ter-
rorism rationale. The Attorney General’s Department noted that this aspect of the 
offence ‘drives at the root cause of the problem of terrorism by focusing on 
violence that is behind it’.162 Singling out acts of incitement of group-to-group 
violence, rather than the incitement of discrimination against individuals on the 
grounds of their membership of a particular group, may be counterproductive. 
There is concern that this feature of the offence ‘stigmatises inter-group violence 
and reinforces the stereotyping of certain ethnicities or religions as terrorists.’163 
Do we really need this species of sedition in the Criminal Code that criminal-
ises the urging of force or violence between groups by individuals acting with 
discriminatory motives? Should the federal criminal law be linked to 
anti-discrimination law through this new sedition offence? To both questions, our 
answer is no. In simple terms, an offence which attempts to meld security and 
anti-discrimination rationales produces definitional incoherence, and creates an 
offence which is either under-inclusive or over-inclusive, depending on the 
rationale which is accorded priority. 
A final source of unease relating to s 80.2(5) is the likely effect of importing 
anti-discrimination law into the criminal law — this relates to the ‘neutrality’ 
between groups distinguished under this offence. In common with 
anti-discrimination law generally, the new offence of sedition does not expressly 
identify those disadvantaged groups requiring protection under the law. The law 
is framed in neutral terms as a right to equality or non-discrimination. Thus, for 
example, under anti-discrimination law, both men and women have a right to 
equal treatment. There is a significant body of critical feminist scholarship 
outlining the weaknesses of equality jurisprudence, which conceals and denies 
 
161 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 109. 
162 Submission to ALRC, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia, 12 April 2006, 
Submission No 31 (Attorney-General’s Department), cited in ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 
208. 
163 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 209. In addition, recent research by the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission shows that since September 11, Australian Arabs and Muslims 
are often vilified based on a perception that they share responsibility for terrorism or are poten-
tial terrorists: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Isma — Listen: National 
Consultations on Eliminating Prejudice against Arab and Muslim Australians (2004). 
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remedies for the structural disadvantages in both the public and private spheres 
that only women experience.164 In the current sedition offence, there is equiva-
lent ‘neutrality’ which may not serve to protect those minorities who have been 
historically oppressed and harmed by racial or religious violence (including 
Aboriginal, Jewish and Islamic communities).165 Worse still, there is a risk that 
the offence may be counterproductive, intensifying the surveillance and policing 
of these communities (which are already subject to disproportionately high levels 
of policing).166 It is not inconceivable that the offence would be used to criminal-
ise minority leaders who advocate forceful resistance against everyday violence 
and discrimination by Anglo-Saxon Australians.167 In light of the above con-
cerns, a preferable strategy may be to address racist motivations by targeting 
specified vulnerable groups through general sentencing enhancement powers at 
the federal level, tagging federal anti-discrimination policy to the law of sentenc-
ing, rather than to special anti-terrorism offences. 
V  BALANCING SEDITIOUS INTENTIONS AND ‘GOOD FAITH’ 
DEFENCES 
The physical elements of the sedition offences are broad. However, an impor-
tant safeguard in relation to these offences is the role of fault and the availability 
of defences. As the ALRC noted, this is the key issue for law reform: 
Under the Terms of Reference, the central questions for this Inquiry are 
whether the new sedition regime (taking together the offences in s 80.2 and the 
‘good faith’ defence in s 80.3) is well-articulated as a matter of criminal law, 
and strikes an acceptable balance in a tolerant society.168 
The ALRC recommended that the offences require proof that the person in-
tended that the force or violence urged would occur.169 The ALRC claims the 
precise meaning of ‘intentionally’ in this context ‘will be determined by ordinary 
usage and the common law’.170 However, the extent to which the pre-Criminal 
Code common law concepts should guide Criminal Code construction remains 
 
164 The limits of rights to formal equality in law were reviewed in ALRC, Equality before the Law: 
Women’s Equity — Part II, Report No 69 (1994). The majority of commissioners recommended 
a ‘neutral’ equality right, with a minority arguing for an equality guarantee in the following 
gendered terms: ‘Every woman has the right to equality in law.’: at [16.22]; see also at [16.19]. 
See further Stephen Bottomley and Simon Bronitt, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2006) ch 8, especially 
at 272. 
165 The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission documented in a 1991 report wide-
spread racial violence against minorities, including Aboriginal, Jewish and Islamic communities 
in Australia: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Racist Violence, above n 121, 
69–177, 209–26. At the time of publication, Sheik Feiz Mohammad allegedly made comments 
that referred to Jews as ‘evil’ and calling them ‘pigs’. Acting Attorney-General Kevin Andrews 
has indicated that this case will be reviewed by the Australian Federal Police to determine 
whether sedition charges could be laid: see Jano Gibson and Nick O’Malley, ‘Jews Attacked in 
Sheik’s Video Nasty’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 January 2007, 1. 
166 See Bronitt and McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 745–7, 764–5. 
167 There is a significant debate about the value of equality rights: see ibid 126–35. 
168 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 13. 
169 See above n 76 and accompanying text. 
170 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 175–6, citing I Leader-Elliot, Attorney-General’s Depart-
ment, The Commonwealth Criminal Code: A Guide for Practitioners (2002) 61. 
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controversial.171 Regrettably, the ALRC analysis of the fault element overlooked 
how the ‘default’ definitions of intention would interact with its recommenda-
tions. The Criminal Code has adopted a twofold definition of intention with 
respect to results, which extends to a person who ‘means to bring it about or is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events’.172 The latter mental 
state (which is called an ‘oblique’ or ‘indirect’ intention) is said to encompass the 
morally equivalent mental state of awareness of a consequence as being ‘virtu-
ally certain’ to occur. 
In the context of terrorism, this extended definition of intention has a broad 
reach: inflammatory political speeches calling for ‘violent jihad’ in Australia 
may exhibit no direct desire that the urging will precipitate violence, but the 
extended definition permits intention to cover cases where the person is aware 
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. Under this definition, publica-
tion of extracts from the so-called ‘Books of Hate’ on the internet,173 dealing 
with provocative jihadist themes of suicide bombing and martyrdom operations, 
would arguably fall within the definition. Bearing in mind the breadth of the 
physical element, which proscribes urging the use of force or violence, rather 
than the incitement of specific offences of violence, terrorism or public disorder, 
there is a strong argument that intention should be restricted to its narrowest 
form of ‘meaning’ to bring about that consequence — a position which is 
consistent with the common law governing attempt, incitement, and aiding and 
abetting.174 
The potential breadth of the physical and fault elements of sedition is further 
balanced by the availability of the six ‘good faith’ defences contained in s 80.3 of 
the Criminal Code: 
(1) Sections 80.1 and 80.2 do not apply to a person who: 
(a) tries in good faith to show that any of the following persons are 
mistaken in any of his or her counsels, policies or actions: 
(i) the Sovereign; 
(ii) the Governor-General; 
(iii) the Governor of a State; 
(iv) the Administrator of a Territory; 
(v) an adviser of any of the above; 
(vi) a person responsible for the government of another country; 
or 
(b) points out in good faith errors or defects in the following, with a 
view to reforming those errors or defects: 
(i) the Government of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory; 
(ii) the Constitution; 
 
171 Gani, ‘Codifying the Criminal Law’, above n 16. 
172 Criminal Code s 5.2 (emphasis added). See also Bronitt and McSherry, Principles of Criminal 
Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 175–6, 892–3 (discussing ‘oblique’ intention in relation to terrorism). 
173 See above nn 31–2 and accompanying text. 
174 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473, 506 (Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
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(iii) legislation of the Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or an-
other country; 
(iv) the administration of justice of or in the Commonwealth, a 
State, a Territory or another country; or 
(c) urges in good faith another person to attempt to lawfully procure a 
change to any matter established by law, policy or practice in the 
Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or another country; or 
(d) points out in good faith any matters that are producing, or have a 
tendency to produce, feelings of ill-will or hostility between differ-
ent groups, in order to bring about the removal of those matters; or 
(e) does anything in good faith in connection with an industrial dispute 
or an industrial matter; or 
(f) publishes in good faith a report or commentary about a matter of 
public interest. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in sub-
section (1). See subsection 13.3(3). 
The ‘good faith’ defence recognised at common law, and subsequently incor-
porated into statutory form, reflects the origins of the offence as a form of 
seditious libel. In historical terms, the common law defamation defence of ‘good 
faith’ played a key role in maintaining sedition within proper bounds. This was 
particularly important in the 19th century, when the offence proscribed behaviour 
that today would be regarded as legitimate political agitation for reform or 
criticism of public officials.  
The modern defence in s 80.3 provides six examples of behaviour in ‘good 
faith’, though these are not intended to be exhaustive. In the modern criminal 
law, the use of ‘good faith’ — beyond these prescribed ‘public interest’ defences 
— seems anomalous for a number of reasons. First, the concept of ‘good faith’ 
(while familiar to defamation and equity lawyers) is rarely used in the criminal 
law, and there is little (if any) criminal jurisprudence which can guide juries or 
judges, as well as the wider community, on the precise exculpatory matters that 
will fall within the scope of the defence.175 The legislation directs the court to 
consider the presence of the following intentions in s 80.3(2) in determining the 
contours of the defence: 
In considering a defence under subsection (1), the Court may have regard to 
any relevant matter, including whether the acts were done: 
(a) for a purpose intended to be prejudicial to the safety or defence of the 
Commonwealth; or 
(b) with the intention of assisting an enemy: 
(i) at war with the Commonwealth; and 
(ii) specified by Proclamation made for the purpose of paragraph 
80.1(1)(e) to be an enemy at war with the Commonwealth; or 
 
175 The ALRC notes that the concept has been incorporated as a defence to racial vilification under 
Commonwealth law, which is a civil rather than criminal provision. In contrast, it is not a de-
fence to the criminal offence of serious racial vilification in New South Wales: ALRC, Fighting 
Words, above n 6, 248. 
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(c) with the intention of assisting another country, or an organisation, that 
is engaged in armed hostilities against the Australian Defence Force; 
or 
(d) with the intention of assisting a proclaimed enemy of a proclaimed 
country (within the meaning of subsection 24AA(4) of the Crimes Act 
1914); or 
(e) with the intention of assisting persons specified in paragraphs 
24AA(2)(a) and (b) of the Crimes Act 1914; or 
(f) with the intention of causing violence or creating public disorder or a 
public disturbance. 
Presumably, proof of one of these intentions excludes the operation of the 
‘good faith’ defence.176 As the ALRC has pointed out, where the prosecution is 
required to establish intention in relation to the key physical elements — namely 
to urge force or violence with the intention that it will occur — ‘good faith’ 
defences become largely redundant.177 Rather than make intention relevant to 
‘good faith’ (or lack thereof) ‘through the backdoor’, it is preferable to define the 
fault element in ways that ‘do not extend to legitimate activities or unduly 
impinge on freedom of expression in the first place’.178 To that end, the ALRC 
recommended that the ‘good faith’ defences be repealed, requiring that the 
tribunal of fact consider, in determining whether there is intention, the context in 
which the communication occurred — namely, whether it occurred in the course 
of or in connection with an artistic performance or work, for a genuine academic, 
artistic or scientific purpose, in connection with an industrial protest, or when 
reporting news.179 These draw heavily on the public interest factors that have 
been developed in relation to defences for obscene publications, and have also 
been incorporated into federal law to guide classification decisions.180 
Reframing ‘good faith’ to include public interest factors is desirable. However, 
the proposal to view them as evidential factors relevant to intention poses some 
difficulties. On a conceptual level, public interest factors do not bear on whether 
or not a person urged the use of force or violence with the intention that it will 
occur; the factors function independently of that question, presenting themselves 
as exculpatory excuses. In our view, the case for including a general ‘public 
interest’ defence falls away if a narrower ambit for the fault element of core 
offences is adopted. Indeed, morally speaking, should people who urge the use of 
violence or force with the intention (in the narrower sense of meaning) that it 
will occur be excused because of the context in which the conduct occurred?  
 
176 This effect is not expressly stated in Criminal Code s 80.3. In contrast, the former ‘good faith’ 
defence in Crimes Act s 24F(2) stated that an act or thing done with one of these prescribed 
intents is ‘not an act or thing done in good faith’. 
177 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 257. 
178 Ibid 259. 
179 See Recommendation 12–2: ibid 261. 
180 For example, at the Commonwealth level, ‘literary, artistic or educational merit’ are some of the 
matters to be taken into account in deciding whether material is offensive: Criminal Code 
s 473.4(b). A similar approach is taken in Victoria, where it is a defence if the material ‘pos-
sesses artistic merit or is for a genuine medical, legal, scientific or educational purpose’: Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic) s 70(2)(b). 
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The case for retaining public interest defences is much stronger if an extended 
definition of intention is applied which encompasses awareness that the use of 
violence or force will occur in the ordinary course of events — the state of mind 
which could catch journalists and academics who publish material dealing with 
provocative jihadist themes. As an inchoate offence directed to averting serious 
consequences (for example, overthrow of the Australian Constitution), it seems 
preferable that public interest factors, if they operate at all, should be incorpo-
rated into the offence provisions. Certainly, if the scope of the physical and fault 
elements for sedition are narrowed in the ways suggested above, constitutional 
law and international human rights law do not impose the further demand that 
defendants have broad ‘fallback’ defences of ‘good faith’ or public interest. 
VI  SEDITION AS  A CRIME OF  UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Even prior to September 11, the general trend favoured an increasingly broad 
view of geographical jurisdiction under the criminal law.181 The traditional 
common law view that ‘all crime is local’ was increasingly supplemented by a 
more flexible idea of criminal jurisdiction. In Australia, the federal jurisdiction 
has undertaken the most significant overhaul of the law, incorporating the Model 
Criminal Code provisions into the Criminal Code. The most innovative aspect of 
the reform is that it is now for Parliament (rather than for the courts) to specify a 
priori the scope of jurisdiction in relation to specific offences. The ‘categorisa-
tion’ model includes a default standard of geographic jurisdiction (which is based 
on territoriality), supplemented by several categories of extended geographical 
jurisdiction (Categories A to D).182  
The Commonwealth has liberally departed from the default standard in relation 
to terrorism offences including sedition. Sedition is designated as a ‘Category D’ 
offence, which has the broadest extraterritorial reach. This makes sedition a 
crime of universal jurisdiction, to use the international law terminology.183 In 
common with the terrorism offences created in 2002, this offence applies to any 
person (both citizens and non-citizens) regardless of whether the conduct (or 
results of the conduct) occurred in Australia. Reflecting concerns about potential 
over-breadth, the sedition offence requires the consent of the Attorney-General 
for prosecution.184 Putting aside the practical difficulties of enforcement, which 
apply to all crimes of universal jurisdiction, there are some objections to the 
application of Category D to the offences of urging others to assist enemies or 
engage in hostilities against Australia. These offences, like treason, imply an a 
priori allegiance on the part of the defendant towards Australia (which, in this 
 
181 See generally Bronitt and McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 855, which 
traces the development of non-geographic jurisdiction in the federal law. 
182 Criminal Code ss 15.1–15.4. 
183 Criminal Code s 80.4. For a discussion on the expansion of Category D jurisdiction, and the 
influence of intentional law on the development of domestic criminal jurisdiction, see Bronitt 
and McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 856–60. 
184 The ALRC has argued that this further safeguard was unnecessary since the Attorney-General’s 
consent is required for all Category D offences where the conduct occurs outside Australia, or 
the person is not Australian: see Criminal Code s 16.1, discussed in ALRC, Fighting Words, 
above n 6, 269–71. 
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context, would be unreasonable to impose on non-citizens).185 While the ALRC 
accepted this argument in relation to treason, and inserted a requirement that the 
defendant be an Australian citizen or resident, it recommended preserving 
universal jurisdiction for sedition offences,186 accepting the Attorney-General’s 
argument that extraterritoriality is needed to address dissemination of offending 
material via the internet.187 
VII   SEDITION AND RETROSPECTIVE LAW REFORM? 
Much of the debate about the expansion of state power to combat terrorism has 
been framed as a question of balance between security and liberty.188 The 
‘balancing approach’ has been very influential in counter-terrorism law reform in 
Australia, which seeks to reconcile security and respect for fundamental liberal 
rights and values.189 As Attorney-General Philip Ruddock has pointed out, 
‘[t]here will always be a trade-off between national security and individual 
rights. The task of Government is to recognise these trade-offs and preserve our 
security without compromising basic rights and liberties.’190 
There has been sustained criticism of the use of balancing concepts and meta-
phors to guide criminal justice reform.191 The prospect of reasoned public debate 
seems remote, though the Howard Government persists in framing 
counter-terrorism reform as the striking of a balance between security and 
liberty.  
As this article has revealed, there are significant challenges in balancing the 
demands of security and human rights within the structure of a coherent legisla-
tive framework. In relation to new substantive offences, preventative powers and 
surveillance tools, the Government has not placed human rights at the centre of 
 
185 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 235. 
186 Ibid 235–6. 
187 Submission to ALRC, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia, 12 April 2006, 
Submission No 31 (Attorney-General’s Department), cited in ibid 238–9. The policy and eviden-
tial difficulties of extended jurisdiction in relation to cybercrime is discussed in Simon Bronitt 
and Miriam Gani, ‘Shifting Boundaries of Cybercrime: From Computer Hacking to Cyberterror-
ism’ (2003) 27 Criminal Law Journal 303, 312–17. 
188 See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ (2003) 11 Journal of 
Political Philosophy 191. 
189 The balanced approach was adopted in Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 
[No 2] and Related Bills (2002). See also George Williams, ‘Australian Values and the War on 
Terrorism’, Review, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 7 February 2003, 6; George 
Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of Rights: Freedom in the War on Terror (2004) ch 3. 
190 Philip Ruddock, ‘The Commonwealth Response to September 11: The Rule of Law and National 
Security’ (Speech delivered at the National Forum on the War on Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 
New South Wales Parliament House, 10 November 2003) <http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/ 
publications/papers/docs/2003/88_PhilipRuddock.pdf>. 
191 See, eg, Lucia Zedner, ‘Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal 
Justice’ (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 507; Simon Bronitt, ‘Constitutional Rhetoric v 
Criminal Justice Realities: Unbalanced Responses to Terrorism?’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 
76; Miriam Gani, ‘Upping the Ante in the “War on Terror”’ in Patty Fawkner (ed), A Fair Go in 
an Age of Terror: Uniya’s Jesuit Lenten Seminars 2003 and 2004 (2004) 80, 90–101. For an 
earlier critique of balancing in the criminal justice context, see Andrew Ashworth, ‘Crime, 
Community and Creeping Consequentialism’ [1996] Criminal Law Review 220. These themes 
are further developed in Waldron, above n 188, critiquing the balancing approach in the context 
of special laws to advance the ‘War on Terror’. 
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regulatory design.192 Rather, it has tended to defer to the perceived needs of law 
enforcement, security concerns, and the untested claims that existing laws and 
general principles are inadequate or ill-suited to the task. Human rights should 
not be balanced away by security interests as a matter of course. As many human 
rights scholars have pointed out, human rights (such as to privacy and to a fair 
trial) may be subject to permissible limitations in the name of security, provided 
these are both necessary and proportionate.193 Since the legal expression of 
human rights is rarely unqualified or absolute,194 the correct approach to policy 
development in this field is to promote strict compliance with (rather than broad 
derogation from) the human rights expressed in international treaties and 
relevant case law, and those contained in domestic human rights legislation.195 
Although Australia has devoted considerable resources to prosecuting the ‘War 
on Terror’, law reform has been conducted largely ‘on the cheap’. With limited 
time and resources, government has been encouraged to draw upon 
‘off-the-shelf’ solutions. One such example is the Australian definition of 
‘terrorist act’, which follows the definition in the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK) c 11, 
albeit with some significant differences.196 A similar approach was adopted in 
relation to sedition, with the impetus for the reform drawn from Europe, though 
in its substance, the definition draws heavily on the recommendations of the 
Gibbs Committee, which reviewed federal criminal law in the 1980s for different 
purposes. 
Terrorism law reform is often foreshadowed with limited detail, through media 
releases aimed at ‘softening’ the community to the general concept — a form of 
legal product testing — before a detailed legislative package is unveiled at a later 
date. The most damaging aspect of the post-September 11 public policy envi-
 
192 Regarding the place of human rights in regulatory theories, see generally Bronitt and McSherry, 
Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 41–2. 
193 This point has been made recently in the review of the federal terrorism laws enacted in 2002: 
see Security Legislation Review Committee, Attorney-General’s Department, Australia, Report 
of the Security Legislation Review Committee (2006) 39, endorsing the views expressed in the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s submission. See generally Connor Gearty, 
Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (2004). 
194 There are only a few absolute rights, such as the right not to be subject to ‘torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’: ICCPR, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 7 (entered into force 23 March 1976). In the post-September 11 envi-
ronment, some scholars have called for a reassessment of this absolute position: see, eg, Alan 
Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge 
(2002); Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke, ‘Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Cir-
cumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justified’ (2005) 39 University of San Francisco Law 
Review 581. 
195 Australia has not yet adopted a bill of rights at the federal level, though the Australian Capital 
Territory and Victoria have adopted human rights legislation modelled in part on the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42: see Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT); Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic) comes into effect on 1 January 2007 (with some provisions to become effective from 1 
January 2008). 
196 One key difference relates to the added significant transnational dimension, bringing any acts of 
terrorism in the world within the potential reach of Australian jurisdiction — ‘terrorist act’ in-
cludes ‘coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a 
State, Territory or foreign country’: Criminal Code s 100.1 (emphasis added). For a discussion of 
the significance of this ‘global’ definition of terrorism, see Bottomley and Bronitt, above n 164, 
ch 14. 
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ronment is the tendency to link the vulnerability to attack to a presumed inade-
quacy of existing powers and criminal laws, rather than to the capacity of both 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.197 In this pressured environment, 
where the political target becomes law reform, there is insufficient time for a 
considered review of public policy or legislative options. The political impera-
tive to act in order to reassure the electorate is a hard pressure to resist. There is 
no allowance for a systematic process of review examining the reach of existing 
laws, or whether minor adaptation could achieve a result more consistent with 
the existing fabric and fundamental principles of Australian criminal law. Indeed, 
the compromise of the process of law reform has been particularly acute in 
relation to the ‘War on Terror’, but should be understood as part of a wider 
‘uncivil politics of law and order’198 that shapes and distorts criminal justice 
reform generally. As David Brown notes, this climate has several effects on law 
reform: 
One consequence is the tendency to sideline, by-pass or ignore official law re-
form reports as unresponsive to political imperatives requiring instant re-
sponses to media legitimation crises around particular cases. Another possible 
consequence is the extent to which law reform commissions and their work 
may lose credibility and authority in the face of a more general anti-elites 
movement, expressing the rise of a public voice challenging traditional forms 
of expert discourse.199 
The reform of sedition law largely conforms to this ‘uncivil’ model. New laws 
governing preventative detention and sedition were enacted in late 2005. The 
Anti-Terrorism Act [No 2] 2005 (Cth) was enacted with indecent haste, notwith-
standing significant community interest and concern about its potential impact. 
With only one week scheduled for public submissions, the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Committee received submissions from 294 individuals and 
organisations.200 At the close of submissions, the Senate Committee then had 
only 11 business days to review and make recommendations on the Bill. Not 
 
197 A recent example is the debate over the preventative detention laws, which were adopted 
following the Council of Australian Governments meeting in September 2005. The Council 
agreed to the enactment of a series of anti-terrorist measures. The Australian Government agreed 
to amend the Criminal Code to provide for preventative detention and the issuing of control 
orders. The states and territories agreed to enact complementary legislation to give effect to the 
parts of the scheme for which the Commonwealth lacks constitutional capacity to legislate: see 
Council of Australian Governments, ‘Special Meeting on Counter-Terrorism’ (Communiqué, 27 
September 2005) 4 <http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/270905/coag270905.pdf>. Reflecting the 
demands of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), the Australian Capital Territory’s Stanhope 
Government enacted territory legislation which had more stringent due process safeguards than 
counterpart federal and state laws. Both the Australian Government and the Australian Federal 
Police presented this behaviour as irresponsible: see, eg, Ben Doherty ‘Canberra Is Target for 
Terror: Soft Laws to Blame: Keelty’, The Canberra Times (Canberra), 1 February 2006, 1. 
198 The phrase ‘uncivil politics of law and order’ was used before September 11 to describe the 
trend to drive criminal justice reform in Australia by reference to ‘law and order’ commonsense, 
rather than by informed expert opinion or available data: Russell Hogg and David Brown, Re-
thinking Law and Order (1998) ch 1. 
199 David Brown, ‘Challenges to Criminal Justice Reform’ in Brian Opeskin and David Weisbrot 
(eds), The Promise of Law Reform (2005) 343, 356. 
200 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill 
[No 2] 2005, above n 37, 215–17. 
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surprisingly, few significant changes were made to the Bill before its enact-
ment.201 
Due to the public concern aroused by this Bill, the Government sought to 
reassure the community (and the Opposition) by referring the sedition reforms to 
the ALRC for retrospective inquiry and report. Though the new laws were safely 
in place, the pressure to conduct the review process swiftly did not abate: public 
consultation for this review, which examined how the new law interacts with 
existing offences, proceeded within a very tight timetable. While most ALRC 
inquiries take one or more years to complete, the ALRC was asked to report 
within three months.202 While the ALRC is to be commended for its attempt to 
develop a broad consultation strategy with stakeholders, the constrained time 
frame placed both the ALRC and the respondents under considerable pressure. 
The resulting recommendations suggested modernising and clarifying some of 
the legal definitions, symbolically expunging sedition, with its ‘historical 
baggage’, from our legal lexicon.203 However, repackaging the offence as a 
renamed public order crime, as the ALRC recommends, does not address the 
problems caused by the attempt to meld security and human rights rationales into 
a single offence of urging inter-group violence. In our view, the result is an 
offence which is ineffective, as it is either over-inclusive or under-inclusive 
depending on which one of the rationales is accorded priority. 
VIII   CONCLUSION 
Law reform agendas place a high premium on the liberal values of consistency, 
clarity and coherence. The ‘rationalising enterprise’ behind criminal law reform 
struggles with the inherent ‘political’ questions about criminalisation.204 It is no 
surprise then that the review undertaken by the ALRC focused largely on the 
modernisation of legal definitions and key concepts, and the need to ‘balance’ 
competing interests relating to security and human rights.205 One of the key 
recommendations of the ALRC is to rename sedition, placing the offences within 
a new ‘public order’ framework of urging political or inter-group force or 
 
201 The Attorney-General announced on 1 December 2005 that the Australian Government would 
amend the Anti-Terrorism Bill [No 2] 2005 (Cth) to incorporate some of the recommendations of 
the Senate Committee: see Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Government Enhances Anti-Terror 
Bill’ (Press Release, 1 December 2005). These amendments concerned: the right of the detainee 
to present information in relation to a control order and to receive a copy of the order; special 
protections for detainees between 16 and 18 years of age; detainees’ capacity to contact par-
ents/guardians and legal representatives; clarification of the procedural requirements for the 
issuing of final control orders; and the insertion of a requirement to notify the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman when a control order or prohibited contact order is made and to provide the Om-
budsman with a copy of that order and summary of the grounds on which it was made. In rela-
tion to sedition, the Bill was amended to clarify that seditious intention requires the intention to 
use force or violence to effect the listed purposes. 
202 ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 41. 
203 See Recommendation 2–1: ibid 67. 
204 For an example of a conflict between rationalisation and criminalisation politics, see Bronitt and 
McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 786–9. 
205 The ALRC recommended that the states and territories remove the term ‘sedition’ from these 
offences, modernise key concepts, and harmonise the offences with the federal approach: see 
Recommendation 2–1: ALRC, Fighting Words, above n 6, 67. 
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violence.206 While modernisation is not objectionable, it fails to confront the 
conceptual and practical difficulties of melding security and human rights 
rationales for these various offences. This is most apparent in relation to the 
offence of urging inter-group force or violence. Rather than forcing these 
offences into the federal counter-terrorism framework, it would be more effective 
to address discriminatory violence through anti-vilification provisions (including 
sentence enhancement) at the state or territory level. When framed in this way, 
the law could address a wider range of conduct that precipitates violent crime 
against minorities, and would minimise the risk of these measures becoming yet 
another form of legal oppression for already persecuted communities. 
In general terms, we remain doubtful that enacting ‘exceptional’ terrorist 
offences is the appropriate strategy for law reform. Although appealing to 
politicians and ‘law and order’ constituencies, incorporating ‘political’ and 
‘religious’ ideologies into the definition of offences places a person’s belief 
system on trial, rather than focusing forensic attention on the harm (actual and 
potential) that the person has committed or intended to commit. Before Septem-
ber 11, 2001, most countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia, used 
the ordinary criminal law to prosecute terrorist offences, and specialist legisla-
tion was not deemed necessary.207 The preference of a strategy of legal normali-
sation over exceptionalism is reinforced by the principles articulated by the 
International Commission of Jurists in The Berlin Declaration in 2004:  
In combating terrorism, states should apply and where necessary adapt existing 
criminal laws rather than create new, broadly defined offences or resort to ex-
treme administrative measures, especially those involving deprivation of lib-
erty.208 
Unfortunately, Australia’s current approach to terrorism law reform is unlikely 
to change. A real danger arises from unintended ‘trickle down’ effects of this 
approach. The events of September 11 have heralded a broad array of preventa-
tive laws in Australia. Criminal laws now target organisations, not just individu-
als, criminalising the status and belief system of a person as much as the harm 
which that person intends or causes. This trend towards prevention in the 
criminal law was evident before September 11, though terrorism has provided a 
further impetus for intensification and expansion.209 Prosecution and deterrence 
 
206 The ALRC had proposed to reframe Criminal Code s 80.2 more broadly as ‘Offences against 
Political Liberty and Public Order’: ALRC, Review of Sedition Laws, Discussion Paper, 
above n 6, 39.  
207 Ben Brandon, ‘Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: 120 Years of the UK’s Legal 
Response to Terrorism’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 981. A Privy Counsellor Review Commit-
tee recommended that ordinary criminal justice and security provisions continue to be the pre-
ferred way, so far as possible, of countering terrorism: Privy Counsellor Review Committee, 
United Kingdom, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: Report (2003) 8. To the 
extent that special counter-terrorism legislation is deemed necessary, it should be kept distinct 
from the mainstream criminal law. 
208 International Commission of Jurists, The Berlin Declaration: The ICJ Declaration on Upholding 
Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism (28 August 2004) 2 <http://www.icj. 
org/IMG/pdf/Berlin_Declaration.pdf>. 
209 For a review of this trend, see the research by Andrew Goldsmith discussed in Bronitt and 
McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed), above n 1, 878. It has been suggested that it 
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is no longer the ultimate objective or endgame, but rather it is surveillance and 
disruption of suspect groups. The impact of September 11 on the legitimacy of 
law reform processes has been highly deleterious — the contributions of law 
reform agencies, as well as parliamentary committees, have been sidelined. 
Within the climate of political exigency, where security outweighs human rights 
at every turn, the scope for genuine community involvement and informed 
academic research on terrorism law reform is highly constrained. The question 
for legal scholars and practitioners is how long these trends will continue and 
how best to promote strategies for law reform in which human rights and 
fundamental legal values are protected and respected, rather than viewed as 
luxuries that liberal democratic societies can no longer afford. 
 
would be sensible to employ a version of the precautionary principle in relation to terrorism 
threats: see Cass R Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (2005) 61. 
